Silicon Investor - Qurate Retail

[Sean Collett] RE: QVCGP The Alternate Plan: The equity committee request was withdrawn but th...

Sean Collett — 5/9/2026 5:01:19 PM

RE: QVCGP

The Alternate Plan:
The equity committee request was withdrawn but the holders have now started a new fight on Friday May 8th, 2026 to terminate the exclusivity under 11 U.S.C § 1121(d). The hearing was moved from May 8th, 2026 to May 18th, 2026 to likely accommodate this. There appears to be a confidential email that was uncovered in discovery and requested to be sealed, so it's unclear what these holders are using as evidence.

The preferred holders believe the $400M settlement claim enriches the OpCo creditors while stripping value from them and also not giving them an opportunity to defend. They state that the plan "mysteriously gifts QVCG's valuable 62% equity stake in Cornerstone to QVC for no consideration" is a violation. The preferred holders will fight this "draconian settlement" by financing QVCG defense at no cost to QVCG's creditors. The filing states "certain of the Preferred Shareholders are prepared to fund QVCG’s defense against the Alleged Intercompany Claims through a funding arrangement at no cost to QVCG’s creditors (such funding would be deducted from any recoveries to QVCG Preferred Shareholders). By bearing all costs of litigation, the Preferred Shareholders eliminate the cost-of-litigation factor that the Debtors rely upon to justify the Settlement."

The request is the court terminates QVCG's exclusive periods and allow preferred holders to propose a plan (the "Alternate Plan"); most of this alternate plan is redacted from the filing so it's not clear what their proposal is in full.

It would seem holders, and a few online, believe there is a chance to win here, but I don't. Not even close. I will argue my reasons on why this QVCGP fight is likely as worthless as QVCGP shares (even if the logic from the preferred lawyers is VERY solid).

Holder Math:
The current group of QVCGP holders have a combined 2,814,238 shares of QVCGP which is about 22.1% of the outstanding shares (12,723,158). Sona Asset Management filed a request to accumulate around 1,567,794 shares of QVCGP which would give the total filing pool 4,382,032 or about 34.4% of the outstanding claims if Sona's request to accumulate is approved.

From a bankruptcy POV if we "assume" this was a real impaired and voting class, which today it is not according to the prepack, already this is not 66 2/3 nor 50 percent of number of claims to make this work assuming a judge blew the prepack up and preferred could attempt their own plan -- it's going into it already under majority needed and it's a equity class too. The filing states "additional Preferred Shareholders may join the Preferred Shareholders listed on Exhibit A, and certain Preferred Shareholders may cease to be represented by Counsel in the future"; given the math already present this reads as a need to get more here to make something work which requires a judge to blow a prepack without a enough votes at the start. With the equity committee already withdrawing and folks like Sona just buying their positions now I find it unlikely a judge, in Houston, looks favorably here.

My challenge:
The preferred holders state "The Disinterested Directors of QVC acknowledged that the intercompany settlement was supported by “key QVC creditor groups,” but made no reference to any engagement with the preferred shareholders, as the only party that would be adversely affected thereby" and this is likely because preferred holders are considered equity here putting them towards the bottom.

The preferred holders state "The Plan was presented as a fait accompli. The Debtors negotiated a restructuring support agreement with certain creditor groups—the holders of QVC Notes Claims and RCF Claims—and wrapped the Intercompany Settlement into that prepackaged structure without input from the Preferred Shareholders". OpCo has a $1.7B claim against HoldCo which is legit claim and the disinterested directors for OpCo have a fiduciary duty to then sue HoldCo for recoveries in which there are none and thus the settlement between OpCo and HoldCo disinterested directors.

The real problem for the preferreds is what comes next in this settlement. QRTEP/QVCGP was issued out of nothing. Nada. Magic. They then bled capital from the company until 2025 while it was clear the OpCo debt issues were not improving and the cash used came from OpCo as ParCo does not generate any cash itself. In 2020 OpCo paid $1,184M upstairs, then $963M in 2021, $1,270M in 2022, $437M in 2023, $108M in 2024, and $42M in 2025 for a combined $4,004M in dividends to the parent over that period which could have been used to delever and prevent a chapter 11 and instead the parent used these proceeds to enrich common holders.

The argument is "The QVC Board estimated that the value of these claims could range from approximately $1 billion to approximately $3 billion. Id. at ¶ 22. This is an astonishing revelation. If these claims do, in fact, exist, the officers and directors of QVC and QVCG failed to disclose them in their SEC filings for years." but the intercompany $1.7B promissory note + the dividend payments are all in the OpCo 10-K and the ParCo 10-K and have been for years so nothing was failed to be disclosed in my outsider opinion.

And as for the preferred being issued out of nothing let's turn to QVC's own investor decks:

In the above slide we can see the title as "Creatively Returning Capital to Shareholders" which then feeds into their statements in the Bank of America Levered Finance deck from December 2021 where they state they issued the preferred as a "tax-free dividend to common shareholders".

Given Malone was once reported to have 27,655,931 QVCGB shares (before transfer to Maffei in which Maffei now holds that amount) and Maffei then would have had 30,421,522 QVCGA shares (now Malones) they likely hold a fair share of QVCGP and collected the dividend personally. Since I suspect Maffei as chairman supported this prepack plan I find the current preferred holders getting their support to be unlikely.

QVCGP was not issued to raise capital in order to pay down or term debt, it was issued out of nothing to reward shareholders. QVC stated the "purpose to (a) deliver income and attract a new investor base via preferred dividend, and (b) highlight favorable free cash flow yield for remaining common shares".

Now the preferred argument is "courts terminate exclusivity where, as here, debtors have failed to negotiate with their key stakeholders" but in Texas the lookback period for fraudulent transfers is four years which exposes OpCo to be forced to potentially sue ParCo for these claims which then expose Malone and Maffei given they were on the board and had such a high ownership stake. The 2021 lawsuit that resulted from the Malone/Maffei exchange insinuated they had control/influence over the BOD and this resulted in Malone being forced to not run for board reelection and all this will be used in discovery by OpCo disinterested directors as they attempt a clawback. Given there is a reported $195M in cash here this would have bled very fast leaving little recovery which is then why ParCo settled because in theory the clawback potential far exceeded any liquidation value ParCo has.

Preferred holders now are attempting to blow a prepack with only 22.1% - 34.4% (assuming Sona can actually buy) of the group in a Houston court that typically does not favor equity to prove they are impaired class when said equity was issued out of nothing to enrich common holders since QVCGA was restricted via debt covenants. To boot, they are also willing to invest their own capital to fund legal fees which I find to be an even worse proposition for them.

Let's play ball and assume a judge blows the prepack up and allows ParCo to stand on its own Chapter 11 case so preferred holders can organize and solicit. This will force OpCo disinterested directors to sue ParCo while preferred holders now fight in court and the claims from the OpCo would come before an equity claim regardless leaving them still impaired. The duration here would likely bleed ParCo of the $195M cash and I don't care what anyone tries to argue but CBI is not worth the fight, not for $16M OIBDA it generated in 2025.

The other risk is if ParCo is standing on its own then any trade claims that potentially exist would also stand ahead of preferred which also push them even lower + whatever they owe in administrative claims.

The R/R for preferred is pretty terrible as the longer a court fight goes on. The ParCo risks burning capital for their own legal teams which eats recoveries, ParCo fights clawback suites from OpCo and maybe even HoldCo, and preferred front front their own money here too as they state they will; the IRR here sounds great but the reality is it looks terrible. My assumption is these are threats to try and extract some value from this prepack but in my view they are deep OOTM and the there is enough here to justify the settlements in my view.

The preferred holders argue "it appears that QVCG’s Disinterested Directors relied entirely on the advice of Evercore, which has been advising QVC since the second quarter of 2023, and obtained no independent financial advice of its own" but the preferred holders will need to argue how Carol Flaton & Roger Meltzer w/ Kobre & Kim LLP, Eugine Davis & Thomas Walper w/ Milbank LLP, Jill Frizzley & Paul Keglevic w/ Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, and Jonathan Foster & Michael Zendan w/ Seward & Kissel LLP + Kirkland & Ellis, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, Davis Polk & Wardwell, and Simpson Thacher & Bartlett w/ Lazard all got it wrong. That's some firepower that reviewed and all have come out in support of the plan. The preferreds argue that Evercore created a conflict but there's enough firepower outside Evercore that I think the preferred legal team is super weak here.

Bankruptcy is "fun" as these are the claims that are to be expected to see fought. I personally do not expect much here as the plan was already sent out to vote and any adjustments would require the plan to be adjusted and new votes to be done which will delays things even more. The arguments from the preferreds are valid and they cite decent bankruptcy precedent, but that does offer enough here to assume they actually win anything meaningful except a delay and time. I believe the proposed prepack plan moves as intended and the slew of legal teams which already noted their support of the plan will be able to challenge the arguments made by preferreds legal teams.

To assume the Houston court will blow up a prepack for preferred equity, which does not even have all the votes required if they did, seems unlikely especially with the possibility that current holders drop out too as they state in their own filing and likely will if this drags since it will kill their IRR. If we expect Malone/Maffei control a decent stake in QVCGP then it's very likely they would vote not in favor of preferred and while the preferred state they were not consulted it's also possible they were with Malone/Maffei and it seems many holders of QVCGP are just now buying their positions AFTER the court filings too.

The preferred equity are on their own goal line and it's fourth down and they are going to attempt a deep pass against a stacked defense. They may connect and buy some time for another play but I find winning the game unlikely.

Happy investing,
Sean

[hunterdelarm] Let this be a lesson to those out there thinking they might have a chance/think ...

hunterdelarm — 5/7/2026 5:12:56 AM

Let this be a lesson to those out there thinking they might have a chance/think they can make it. I wasted years of my life on this investment and lost everything-wasted a life. I thought I had this figured out. Do not follow my footsteps. You do not see all the time I spent reading to try and understand this. You do not see the sleepless nights. You do not see the tears. Please learn from me.

Started my position in 2023: Most of the money was in tax advantaged accounts

[Sean Collett] QVCGP: Fighting for their slice Quick update as I am following the court docume...

Sean Collett — 4/29/2026 3:30:28 PM

QVCGP: Fighting for their slice

Quick update as I am following the court documents.

QVCGP holders issued a claim to form an equity committee as they believe they are being shafted and many seems to be unhappy with this $400M settlement claim. Had anyone been reading here I flagged this exact issue months ago.

Alas this old forum picked up a few new readers, but clearly not enough! No one who read here should be surprised.

I wrote about the promissory note being used as a value blocker and today Jill Frizzley and Paul Keglevic confirmed this in document 147. My original thesis was this would present any equity claims for HoldCo/ParCo, but it turned a bit different as HoldCo and ParCo have just folded into OpCo instead. I wrote in September 2025:

"While this promissory note isn't itself an issue, it becomes one once things get to where they are. I wrote before this will become a roadblock for value (equity) upstreaming if the company files chapter 11 in either a prepackaged or freefall scenario. The senior holders will use this against the HoldCo/ParCo to prevent any further value to leak out and protect the only collateral they really have which is the QVC, Inc equity. There are $1,570M principal value of the LITNA debentures and that same company also has a promissory note for $1,740M to QVC, Inc (it's OpCo) which is greater than total value of LITNA debentures - all this would likely need to be addressed before LIC was able to keep any of their equity in QVC, Inc if QVC, Inc were to file."

Today, April 29th, 2026, the disinterested directors responded with Document 147 titled "STATEMENT OF DISINTERESTED DIRECTORS OF QVC, INC. IN SUPPORT OF JOINT PREPACKAGED CHAPTER 11 PLAN OF REORGANIZATION OF QVC GROUP, INC. AND ITS DEBTOR AFFILIATES".

The docket stated:
"The QVC Board also concluded that QVC had potentially viable claims against LINTA (the “LINTA Claims” and together with the QVCG Claims, the “Intercompany Claims”) to recover (i) all or some portion of the balance of outstanding principal and interest on the LINTA Promissory Note and (ii) certain of the Post-2022 Dividends transferred from QVC to LINTA. The QVC Board also concluded that LINTA may have potentially viable claims against QVC relating to: (i) certain payments made to QVC under the LINTA Promissory Note; and (ii) the $277 million capital contribution from LINTA to QVC"

Back in September I also wrote:

"That aside, we go back to the preferred shares. Banks cannot block the ParCo/HoldCo from using their cash how they wish BUT that's where this gets interesting. In theory ParCo owns HoldCo and if cash was used to service preferred equity shares while HoldCo had $1,740M outstanding to OpCo it could open fraudulent conveyance claims and open them to clawback lawsuits (up to 2-4 year for look back period). OpCo in a postpetition suit could claim that money was theirs as they have a promissory note that is due before the preferred shares (2029 vs. 2031 preferred) and parent entities used limited cash to service preferred equity before them."

The document states "The QVC Board further understands that QVCG issued approximately $450 million in quarterly dividend payments to holders of the QVCG Preferred Equity, which dividend payments were funded in large part with cash from QVC." which immediately flags the clawback risk I wrote about months ago.

It goes on to state:

"However, QVC’s ability to successfully assert claims against QVCG and collect these amounts is uncertain. The QVC Board determined that litigation necessary to recover on account of the QVCG Claims would be fact-intensive, costly, and time-consuming, particularly relating to questions of QVC solvency at the time of each of the transfers at issue – which would be an expensive and hotly contested battle of the experts. Further, QVCG has limited cash available, as it is not an operating company and does not generate significant cash flows on its own. Even if QVC were successful in obtaining a judgment against QVCG for any of these claims, QVCG would likely be able to pay only a fraction of such a claim"

Basically the OpCo holders have agreed with LITNA to walk away from filing recoveries to help make this $400M settlement work as the docket states:

"Further, the main constituents and residual value-holders at QVC (i.e. the holders of the RCF Claims and the QVC Notes Claims) had reached an agreement with the holders of the LINTA Notes Claims whereby the QVC-LINTA Claim—which includes all LINTA Claims, including those arising from the LINTA Promissory Note—would not receive a cash distribution from LINTA, and the non-LINTA Debtors would fund a cash pool for the benefit of the holders of the LINTA Notes Claims. In exchange, LINTA would waive any intercompany claims it could otherwise assert against QVC and the other Debtors and agree to give the Debtor Release such that the Intercompany Settlement resolves fully and finally all Intercompany Claims. Although QVC would not recover directly on account of the LINTA Promissory Note, the Intercompany Settlement would eliminate the risk of counterclaims and secure a more efficient and less costly resolution of intercompany issues."

In the end these are settlement claims against the same things I called out months ago. It is an agreement between all disinterested parties to prevent a long legal battle that destroys economic value and also risks NewCo being folded altogether and people losing their careers. The docket states:

"As of the Petition Date, QVCG had only approximately $195 million in available cash, and LINTA had only approximately $86 million. The $400 million QVC-QVCG Settlement Claim reflects that disconnect: while the historical outflows from QVC were substantial in the aggregate, the cash available to satisfy any judgment or settlement is not. At the same time, the QVC Board took into account that all allowed third-party general unsecured claims across the Debtor estates — will be paid in full under the Plan."

The docket ends that the directors are open to discussing alternatives, but I believe this is "talk". There is so little value that any further delay creates too much risk. I suspect the judge will throw out the attempt by QVCGP holders as there is just little room to argue this -- especially in Houston courts. At this stage I believe majority of folks are bought into this plan and QVCGP holders will not get anything.

I see some silly things of valuation for CBI. I challenge with CBI doing adj. OIBDA of $16M in 2025 the thing is worth FAR LESS than folks are giving it credit for. At a 2x multiple (using a 2022-2025 OIBDA ave of $49.25M to be generous) for a specialty retailer in decline it's worth $98.5M before fees and taxes which gives no economic recovery here in a sale.

Happy investing,

Sean

P.S. The LITNA independent directors (Eugene David and Thomas Walper) came out and also supported the settlement plan in document 148.

[sixty2nds] Hello Sean, GREAT and worth Repeating GREAT analysis. Thank you. My mistake w...

sixty2nds — 4/17/2026 5:44:23 PM

Hello Sean,

GREAT and worth Repeating GREAT analysis.

Thank you.

My mistake was misjudging how fast the business would decline.

What I did right was position sizing.
I entered the QVCGP 2X Position neatly.
I refused the temptation to add common for "the juice"
I refused to add and average down over the last 18 months

At the peak I was up 40% plus the Diividends with a yield to cost of 26%.

Normally on a fade in price I would have stopped out.

I was greedy.
I was playing for that $100 mandated March 2031 buyback.
I had too much faith in the "old pros" Houdini Escape Artist with Debt experience.

I did not have the margin of safety I thought I had.

I sold for $1 early this morning booking a 50% loss on QVCGP after the dividends.

Lesson learned.

Safe travels!
60

[GoogleBRK] Sean, you've been the go-to on this situation since March 2025. Thank you for s...

GoogleBRK — 4/17/2026 3:01:03 PM

Sean, you've been the go-to on this situation since March 2025.

Thank you for sharing your meticulously documented analysis and thoughts.

Unfortunately, you've been proven right all along.

May we turn our attention to more successful "investing" endeavors.

[Sean Collett] QVC: Rise Rise of the PhoenixEDIT: Sorry I made an edit and it re-posted multipl...

Sean Collett — 4/17/2026 9:54:01 AM

QVC: Rise Rise of the Phoenix EDIT: Sorry I made an edit and it re-posted multiple times....I added in the liquidation modeling QVC provided + their cash projections.

QVC: Rise Rise of the Phoenix

QVC released their court filings and below I will begin to step through them.

Right away they let us know that several inside were interested in liability management exercises but QVC Group recognized that the decline in linear cable was too great and they had to address their balance sheet. This aligns with my earlier writing where I noted the solicitation for an LME was likely made, but the balance sheet math coupled with the decline did not make sense for QVC.

LME's are popular tools, but they are NOT one-sized fits all. Just because they can be used does not mean they will be used. One must fully understand the capital structure and really the revenue trajectory to know which tool will be used. In my view many treated LME's as a one-sized fits all problem and as Charlie Munger would say "to a man with a hammer everything looks like a nail".

As I also challenged and highlight below, QVC had already engaged in many LME tools already. Ultimetly when you have capital structure complexity, as QVCG does, then the LME is not the best tool to use. QVC, Inc alone had seven tranches of senior secured notes + the facility; too much risk.

The court filing states plainly "And while various parties were interested in several different “liability management” exercises, QVC Group recognized—in the face of linear TV decline—the time had come to address its U.S. balance sheet".

The restructuring process began in the summer with three goals:

QVC developed a business plan that reflected an appropriate capital structure, responsible liquidity balance, and flexibility to continue to reinvest.
Proposed solutions would create minimal disruptions to world-wide operations, vendors, and customers.
Engaged with lenders who organized into several groups. Two at QVC, Inc, one at Liberty Interactive LLC (LI LLC).

This full process has taken eight months according to the filing. NDA's with lenders were signed in October 2025 and QVC began providing diligence on the process. "The diligence totaled tens of thousands of pages—plus extensive Excel modeling—on dozens of different areas, including the business plan, cash flows, trade relationships, intercompany transactions, projections, insurance, tax matters, and litigation portfolio.". Even in Chapter 11 Microsoft getting an Excel plug!

The Restructuring Support Agreement (RSA) will eliminate $6B in debt from the balance sheet, reorganize QVC into a new entity with QVC, Inc taking place as NewCo.

As I wrote a few times and most recently on this board a few days before QVC filed:

"If I take a distressed playbook here then the creditors take the OpCo equity in court and the clean balance gives notes new equity in NewCo and banks can be bought out and/or fund the new RCF for NewCo and then the NewCo operates as a going concern. Even with the secular decline the clean balance sheet, lower interest expense, reduced tax risk, no parent cash dividend, and various other things allow the NewCo holders to have flexibility to navigate and drive organic growth and also drive bolt-on's to grow EBITDA and then potentially flip in 2-3 for a much higher IRR/MOIC. In fact, if what you indicate is even true it's more incentive for creditors to NOT take a haircut.
Since I see little drop-down/uptier flexibility here (as I wrote and shared why) I am not sure what else is driving an LME. The banks don't have incentive to watch cash recoveries go to pari long-duration notes + absorb 100% EBITDA risk and the notes likely see a higher IRR as going concern."

And while it did not play out exactly as I speculated here is what I wrote back in March:
"As for HoldCo/ParCo this is not interesting to me as CBI is not worth what folks are saying it is and I already broke that math down. They file at the same time or not too long after but if they do file there is no "restructuring" here because the cash generating assets are not enough so likely turns into a Chapter 11 liquidation (see my writing on Fat Brands) or even just Chapter 7 and in that case QVCGP sits above QVCGA. This also doesn't assume Liberty and QVCG are consolidated in court given the deep reliance on eachother and tangled financials and then the LI LLC debentures come before QVCGP too."

Essentially ParCo/HoldCo have been liquidated and absorbed into QVC, Inc which will emerge as our Phoenix in NewCo.

Capital Structure:
As we've known this one had a complex capital structure so below is the breakdown:

Now let's get into the meat of this. Below is the capital structure they presented (which all here are well versed in):

The liquidity profile is as follows:

ParCo: $195M
HoldCo: $86M
CBI: $74M
QVC, Inc: $1,350 ($335M is held at QVC International)

Restructuring:
QVC goes on to mention a series of liability management transactions and debt paydowns they have taken since 2020.

In 2020 they took a 15-step restructuring path designed to reduce costs, increase tax efficency, optimize capital deployment, and reduce administrative costs. Certain notes were retired to remove currency and tax risks as E.U. and U.K. were introducing legislation that would impact these. It also helped capture tax savings when they retired the MSI exchangables.
2021 Refinancing: They entered into the current fifth credit agreement that is the one that is currently active. This extended the facility for three years and locked in lower pricing.
2022 Cash Management Plan: This begins the ATHENS moves where Zulily was sold. They then state that they used 70% of their cash + RCF to retire the 2023 notes, used RCF to retire all 2024 notes, engaged in project Nomi to exchange the 2027/2028 notes into new 2029, and used some cash + RCF to fund the 2025 notes. The company also began a series of other restructuring moves which included layoffs and sale-leaseback transactions.

I wrote earlier that LME's are meant to buy time and that QVC had already been engaging in a series of moves. I wrote "we must also remember in September 2024 QVC engaged in Project Nomi led by Morgan Stanley. While there was no creditor-on-creditor violence here (e.g., no drop-down, uptier, or other newer LME moves) this would be an LME as it did what QVC intended which was to buy time by taking the 2027/2028 senior secured notes and moving the majority to 2029 while also reducing principal." and "
so where does this leave us on the LME front? If the purpose is to buy time I would challenge QVC has been buying it. Between using their credit facility to pay down portion of the 2024 notes, all the 2025 notes, and then Project Nomi this has been a series of moves that strategically use cash, their credit facility, and extensions to buy time. Has the business improved? No, it has not.".

What I found interesting is QVC has been engaged with Evercore since the second quarter of 2023 regarding capital structure considerations. Kirkland & Ellis were engaged April 2025 and AlixPartners in May 2025.

As these engagements continued below is the layout of the governing bodies for each layer:

QVC did provide a liquidation analysis in the event the judge does not approve the plan and we have a low/high recovery view:

RSA and the Plan:

There will be a $300M DIP under the DIP LC Credit Agreement provided by JPMorgan Chase that carries a 2.5% interest + fees.

There are a TON of classes here so let's attempt to break this down.

Class A:
A1: Secured claims against QVCG - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
A2: Other priority claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
A3: General unsecured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
A4: QVC-QVCG Settlement Claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
A5: Other intercompany claims against QVCG - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote(presumed to accept/deemed to reject)
A6: QVCG Preferred Equity - impaired - not entitled to vote
A7: Common Equity (QVCGA) - impaired - not entitled to vote
A8: Section 510(b) claims against QVCG - impaired - not entitled to vote

Class B:
B1: Other secured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
B2: Other priority claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
B3: RCF Claims against QVC Debtors - impaired - entitled to vote
B4: QVC Note Claims - impaired - entitled to vote
B5: General unsecured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
B6: Intercompany claims - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
B7: Intercompany interests - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
B8: Section 510(b) claims - impaired - not entitled to vote

Class C:
C1: Other secured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
C2: Other priority claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
C3: LITNA Notes claims - impaired - entitled to vote
C4: General unsecured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
C5: Intercompany claims - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
C6: Intercompany interests - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
C7: Section 510(b) claims - impaired - not entitled to vote

Class D:
D1: Other secured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
D2: Other priority claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
D3: General unsecured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
D4: Intercompany claims - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
D5: Intercompany interests - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
D6: Section 510(b) claims - impaired - not entitled to vote

I won't go through all the claims and their results but the ones most care about.

QVCGP: QVCG Preferred Equity Interests shall be cancelled, released, discharged, extinguished, and of no further force or effect, and such Holders shall not receive any distribution, property, or other value under this Plan on account of such QVCG Preferred Equity Interests.

QVCGA: The QVCG Common Equity Interests shall be cancelled, released, discharged, extinguished, and of no further force or effect, and such Holders shall not receive any distribution, property, or other value under this Plan on account of such QVCG Common Equity Interests.

Credit Facility (RCF): Each Holder of an Allowed RCF Claim shall receive, in full and final satisfaction, settlement, release, and discharge of (a) such portion of its RCF Claim comprising RCF Loan Claims, its Pro Rata share (taking into account Claims in Class B4) of the QVC Funded Debt Plan Consideration and (b) such portion of its RCF Claim comprising RCF Letter of Credit Claims, Cash equal to the full amount of its RCF Letter of Credit Claim; provided that any RCF Letter of Credit that remains undrawn and outstanding as of the Effective Date shall be either (x) rolled into the Exit ABL Facility and granted liens pursuant to the Exit ABL Facility on terms acceptable to the Required Consenting RCF Lenders and the applicable issuing bank, (y) cancelled or returned undrawn to the applicable issuing bank, or (z) cash collateralized or otherwise backstopped in a manner reasonably satisfactory to the applicable issuing bank, in each case, on or prior to the Effective Date and (2) the QVC Debtors or the Reorganized QVC Debtors, as applicable, shall pay in full in Cash all RCF Agent Fees.

QVCN: Each Holder of an Allowed QVC Notes Claim shall receive, in full and final satisfaction, settlement, release, and discharge of such QVC Notes Claim, its Pro Rata share (taking into account Claims in Class B3) of the QVC Funded Debt Plan Consideration and (2) the QVC Debtors or the Reorganized QVC Debtors, as applicable, shall pay in full in Cash all QVC Notes Trustee Fees.

LITNA Notes: Each Holder of an Allowed LINTA Notes Claim shall receive, in full and final satisfaction, settlement, release, and discharge of such LINTA Notes Claim, its Pro Rata share of the LINTA Distributable Cash.

To make this work there are some points:

The QVC-LINTA Claim shall not receive any distributions from the LINTA Debtors or from the
LINTA Distributable Cash. The LINTA Debtors shall waive any and all Intercompany Claims
against the other Debtors.
Debtors that are not LINTA Debtors shall fund the LINTA Settlement Cash Pool, and Holders of
Allowed LINTA Notes Claims shall receive their Pro Rata share of the LINTA Distributable Cash.
See Article III.B.19
The QVC-QVCG Settlement Claim shall be Allowed in the aggregate amount of $400 million and
separately classified in its own class (Class A4), receiving QVCG Distributable Cash in full and
final satisfaction of the QVC-QVCG Settlement Claim. See Article III.B.4.

There will be a new exit ABL facility up to $750M and in the event the ABL does not have a minimum draw requirement there is a Takeback Term Loan Facility and notes will be increased to $1,325M.

Income & cash projections into 2029:

Below is the projections for the balance sheet:

It would appear they intend to keep the DTL in place + with the new $1,325M ABL facility.

The NewCo shall " be authorized to issue the QVC New Equity Interests pursuant to its New Organizational Documents". It appears the intent is to keep the new equity trading on the stock market as well.

Summary:
I wrote back in July 2025 "I am curious how they navigate earnings. Last call they were already getting pressure on facility refinance and the tone around it was different comparing Q4 to Q1. Now you have all the legal firms and board seats....I would think we see some move soon. I think historically in a prepack those usually take 45-60 days to get into place so we're still in that window, but I think something comes soon. Creditors and the company don't want to drag this out because if EBITDA does keep dropping then so do potential recoveries." and while the process post the RCF draw took longer than I expected we indeed did see EBITDA decline going from $1,071M to $755M.

When I flipped bearish in March of 2025 I wrote:

"Have not made a post in a bit, but figure it was worth writing that I was wrong on this one. I think my original thesis on the debt buybacks was correct but I failed to pay attention to the customer declines and also trusted management too much and thus missed the balance sheet wasn't where the action was at but the income statement. They're just losing too many customers to make an investment worth it.

Now one needs to speculate that they change their business into some streaming giant, but in my opinion the moat is just gone. Anyone can setup a cell phone and live stream on Tiktok, Facebook, Reels, YouTube, or wherever else so the barrier for entry is very low and also doesn't come with billions of debt.

Equity currently isn't worth anything and market has priced it as such. I am thankful I trusted my gut and had sold and did not buy back in. Technical analysis may be ignored by some, but it gave me enough to know support was there and with the further fundamental declines it helped stop me from making a mistake."

Later on June 13th, 2025 I wrote:
" This leads me to the unfortunate reality that chapter 11 is likely on the table here..... This will lead to a full chapter 11 filing as truth is QVC has no leverage. Many will argue QVC has potential in the future, but if that is the case then why would I, as a bondholder, take a haircut to help QVCGA equity? If anything I can force myself into new equity in a debt-equity swap and take control of the OpCo asset and the capture the potential in full. The way the company is structured is QVC Group (HoldCo) owns all equity in QVC/HSN (OpCo) so if OpCo files then lenders will likely get new equity in OpCo (OpCo equity is collateral in debt) and take control from HoldCo."; I of course refined this as new data kept coming in.

In the end this went pretty close to how I mapped it. Not perfect by any means, but close enough. My hope is that many reflect on this one and where their analysis went wrong and that greed in investing is never a path to riches but to ruin. If winning the World Series requires a batter with an average .115 to hit a HR in Game 7 of the ninth inning, then you're likely not winning the World Series.

This is not a point to gloat AT ALL but to highlight that if you are not doing your analysis on a distressed turnaround you are 100% setting yourself up for loss. Many put hard-earned money into this and great sums of it and now are questioning how the company got here. I saw numerous takes that ParCo was safe because they had $300-$400M of value and that value was destroyed instantly in a prepack.

This has been a fun journey with you all. I hope you have enjoyed the analysis as much as I enjoyed writing it.

As Edward Murrow with CBS news would say "Good night, and good luck."

Happy investing,
Sean

[Sean Collett]

Sean Collett — 4/17/2026 9:52:01 AM

[Sean Collett] QVC: Rise of the Phoenix QVC released their court filings and below I will begi...

Sean Collett — 4/17/2026 8:58:55 AM

QVC: Rise of the Phoenix

QVC released their court filings and below I will begin to step through them.

Right away they let us know that several inside were interested in liability management exercises but QVC Group recognized that the decline in linear cable was too great and they had to address their balance sheet. This aligns with my earlier writing where I noted the solicitation for an LME was likely made, but the balance sheet math coupled with the decline did not make sense for QVC.

LME's are popular tools, but they are NOT one-sized fits all. Just because they can be used does not mean they will be used. One must fully understand the capital structure and really the revenue trajectory to know which tool will be used. In my view many treated LME's as a one-sized fits all problem and as Charlie Munger would say "to a man with a hammer everything looks like a nail".

As I also challenged and highlight below, QVC had already engaged in many LME tools already. Ultimetly when you have capital structure complexity, as QVCG does, then the LME is not the best tool to use. QVC, Inc alone had seven tranches of senior secured notes + the facility; too much risk.

The court filing states plainly "And while various parties were interested in several different “liability management” exercises, QVC Group recognized—in the face of linear TV decline—the time had come to address its U.S. balance sheet".

The restructuring process began in the summer with three goals:

QVC developed a business plan that reflected an appropriate capital structure, responsible liquidity balance, and flexibility to continue to reinvest.
Proposed solutions would create minimal disruptions to world-wide operations, vendors, and customers.
Engaged with lenders who organized into several groups. Two at QVC, Inc, one at Liberty Interactive LLC (LI LLC).

ParCo: $195M
HoldCo: $86M
CBI: $74M
QVC, Inc: $1,350 ($335M is held at QVC International)

Restructuring:
QVC goes on to mention a series of liability management transactions and debt paydowns they have taken since 2020.

In 2020 they took a 15-step restructuring path designed to reduce costs, increase tax efficency, optimize capital deployment, and reduce administrative costs. Certain notes were retired to remove currency and tax risks as E.U. and U.K. were introducing legislation that would impact these. It also helped capture tax savings when they retired the MSI exchangables.
2021 Refinancing: They entered into the current fifth credit agreement that is the one that is currently active. This extended the facility for three years and locked in lower pricing.
2022 Cash Management Plan: This begins the ATHENS moves where Zulily was sold. They then state that they used 70% of their cash + RCF to retire the 2023 notes, used RCF to retire all 2024 notes, engaged in project Nomi to exchange the 2027/2028 notes into new 2029, and used some cash + RCF to fund the 2025 notes. The company also began a series of other restructuring moves which included layoffs and sale-leaseback transactions.

I wrote earlier that LME's are meant to buy time and that QVC had already been engaging in a series of moves. I wrote "we must also remember in September 2024 QVC engaged in Project Nomi led by Morgan Stanley. While there was no creditor-on-creditor violence here (e.g., no drop-down, uptier, or other newer LME moves) this would be an LME as it did what QVC intended which was to buy time by taking the 2027/2028 senior secured notes and moving the majority to 2029 while also reducing principal." and "
so where does this leave us on the LME front? If the purpose is to buy time I would challenge QVC has been buying it. Between using their credit facility to pay down portion of the 2024 notes, all the 2025 notes, and then Project Nomi this has been a series of moves that strategically use cash, their credit facility, and extensions to buy time. Has the business improved? No, it has not.".

What I found interesting is QVC has been engaged with Evercore since the second quarter of 2023 regarding capital structure considerations. Kirkland & Ellis were engaged April 2025 and AlixPartners in May 2025.

As these engagements continued below is the layout of the governing bodies for each layer:

RSA and the Plan:

There will be a $300M DIP under the DIP LC Credit Agreement provided by JPMorgan Chase that carries a 2.5% interest + fees.

There are a TON of classes here so let's attempt to break this down.

Class A:
A1: Secured claims against QVCG - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
A2: Other priority claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
A3: General unsecured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
A4: QVC-QVCG Settlement Claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
A5: Other intercompany claims against QVCG - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote(presumed to accept/deemed to reject)
A6: QVCG Preferred Equity - impaired - not entitled to vote
A7: Common Equity (QVCGA) - impaired - not entitled to vote
A8: Section 510(b) claims against QVCG - impaired - not entitled to vote

Class B:
B1: Other secured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
B2: Other priority claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
B3: RCF Claims against QVC Debtors - impaired - entitled to vote
B4: QVC Note Claims - impaired - entitled to vote
B5: General unsecured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
B6: Intercompany claims - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
B7: Intercompany interests - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
B8: Section 510(b) claims - impaired - not entitled to vote

Class C:
C1: Other secured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
C2: Other priority claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
C3: LITNA Notes claims - impaired - entitled to vote
C4: General unsecured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
C5: Intercompany claims - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
C6: Intercompany interests - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
C7: Section 510(b) claims - impaired - not entitled to vote

Class D:
D1: Other secured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
D2: Other priority claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
D3: General unsecured claims - unimpaired - not entitled to vote
D4: Intercompany claims - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
D5: Intercompany interests - unimpaired/impaired - not entitled to vote
D6: Section 510(b) claims - impaired - not entitled to vote

I won't go through all the claims and their results but the ones most care about.

QVCGP: QVCG Preferred Equity Interests shall be cancelled, released, discharged, extinguished, and of no further force or effect, and such Holders shall not receive any distribution, property, or other value under this Plan on account of such QVCG Preferred Equity Interests.

QVCGA: The QVCG Common Equity Interests shall be cancelled, released, discharged, extinguished, and of no further force or effect, and such Holders shall not receive any distribution, property, or other value under this Plan on account of such QVCG Common Equity Interests.

Credit Facility (RCF): Each Holder of an Allowed RCF Claim shall receive, in full and final satisfaction, settlement, release, and discharge of (a) such portion of its RCF Claim comprising RCF Loan Claims, its Pro Rata share (taking into account Claims in Class B4) of the QVC Funded Debt Plan Consideration and (b) such portion of its RCF Claim comprising RCF Letter of Credit Claims, Cash equal to the full amount of its RCF Letter of Credit Claim; provided that any RCF Letter of Credit that remains undrawn and outstanding as of the Effective Date shall be either (x) rolled into the Exit ABL Facility and granted liens pursuant to the Exit ABL Facility on terms acceptable to the Required Consenting RCF Lenders and the applicable issuing bank, (y) cancelled or returned undrawn to the applicable issuing bank, or (z) cash collateralized or otherwise backstopped in a manner reasonably satisfactory to the applicable issuing bank, in each case, on or prior to the Effective Date and (2) the QVC Debtors or the Reorganized QVC Debtors, as applicable, shall pay in full in Cash all RCF Agent Fees.

QVCN: Each Holder of an Allowed QVC Notes Claim shall receive, in full and final satisfaction, settlement, release, and discharge of such QVC Notes Claim, its Pro Rata share (taking into account Claims in Class B3) of the QVC Funded Debt Plan Consideration and (2) the QVC Debtors or the Reorganized QVC Debtors, as applicable, shall pay in full in Cash all QVC Notes Trustee Fees.

LITNA Notes: Each Holder of an Allowed LINTA Notes Claim shall receive, in full and final satisfaction, settlement, release, and discharge of such LINTA Notes Claim, its Pro Rata share of the LINTA Distributable Cash.

To make this work there are some points:

The QVC-LINTA Claim shall not receive any distributions from the LINTA Debtors or from the
LINTA Distributable Cash. The LINTA Debtors shall waive any and all Intercompany Claims
against the other Debtors.
Debtors that are not LINTA Debtors shall fund the LINTA Settlement Cash Pool, and Holders of
Allowed LINTA Notes Claims shall receive their Pro Rata share of the LINTA Distributable Cash.
See Article III.B.19
The QVC-QVCG Settlement Claim shall be Allowed in the aggregate amount of $400 million and
separately classified in its own class (Class A4), receiving QVCG Distributable Cash in full and
final satisfaction of the QVC-QVCG Settlement Claim. See Article III.B.4.

There will be a new exit ABL facility up to $750M and in the event the ABL does not have a minimum draw requirement there is a Takeback Term Loan Facility and notes will be increased to $1,325M.

The NewCo shall " be authorized to issue the QVC New Equity Interests pursuant to its New Organizational Documents". It appears the intent is to keep the new equity trading on the stock market as well.
Summary:
I wrote back in July 2025 "I am curious how they navigate earnings. Last call they were already getting pressure on facility refinance and the tone around it was different comparing Q4 to Q1. Now you have all the legal firms and board seats....I would think we see some move soon. I think historically in a prepack those usually take 45-60 days to get into place so we're still in that window, but I think something comes soon. Creditors and the company don't want to drag this out because if EBITDA does keep dropping then so do potential recoveries." and while the process post the RCF draw took longer than I expected we indeed did see EBITDA decline going from $1,071M to $755M.

When I flipped bearish in March of 2025 I wrote:

"Have not made a post in a bit, but figure it was worth writing that I was wrong on this one. I think my original thesis on the debt buybacks was correct but I failed to pay attention to the customer declines and also trusted management too much and thus missed the balance sheet wasn't where the action was at but the income statement. They're just losing too many customers to make an investment worth it.

Now one needs to speculate that they change their business into some streaming giant, but in my opinion the moat is just gone. Anyone can setup a cell phone and live stream on Tiktok, Facebook, Reels, YouTube, or wherever else so the barrier for entry is very low and also doesn't come with billions of debt.

Equity currently isn't worth anything and market has priced it as such. I am thankful I trusted my gut and had sold and did not buy back in. Technical analysis may be ignored by some, but it gave me enough to know support was there and with the further fundamental declines it helped stop me from making a mistake."

Later on June 13th, 2025 I wrote:
" This leads me to the unfortunate reality that chapter 11 is likely on the table here..... This will lead to a full chapter 11 filing as truth is QVC has no leverage. Many will argue QVC has potential in the future, but if that is the case then why would I, as a bondholder, take a haircut to help QVCGA equity? If anything I can force myself into new equity in a debt-equity swap and take control of the OpCo asset and the capture the potential in full. The way the company is structured is QVC Group (HoldCo) owns all equity in QVC/HSN (OpCo) so if OpCo files then lenders will likely get new equity in OpCo (OpCo equity is collateral in debt) and take control from HoldCo."; I of course refined this as new data kept coming in.

In the end this went pretty close to how I mapped it. Not perfect by any means, but close enough. My hope is that many reflect on this one and where their analysis went wrong and that greed in investing is never a path to riches but to ruin. If winning the World Series requires a batter with an average .115 to hit a HR in Game 7 of the ninth inning, then you're likely not winning the World Series.

This is not a point to gloat AT ALL but to highlight that if you are not doing your analysis on a distressed turnaround you are 100% setting yourself up for loss. Many put hard-earned money into this and great sums of it and now are questioning how the company got here. I saw numerous takes that ParCo was safe because they had $300-$400M of value and that value was destroyed instantly in a prepack.

This has been a fun journey with you all. I hope you have enjoyed the analysis as much as I enjoyed writing it.

As Edward Murrow with CBS news would say "Good night, and good luck."

Happy investing,
Sean

[hunterdelarm] Hey Sean just making my rounds: I thought they had a chance even up to today. ...

hunterdelarm — 4/17/2026 1:28:06 AM

Hey Sean just making my rounds:

I thought they had a chance even up to today.

Anyway:

I will always be looking for the strange/unusual. I admit my confidence may not ever return so I will probably just keep to myself but if you ever need anything here is a burner email you can contact me at: hunterdelarmtwitter@gmail.com

Good luck out there.

[Sean Collett] There was also an FAQ released in the recent press announcement. You can find th...

Sean Collett — 4/16/2026 8:56:33 PM

There was also an FAQ released in the recent press announcement. You can find that here.

Some callouts that I found are below but in summary the holding structure will be eliminated and QVC, Inc will be the front facing public company. All existing equity will be cancelled which also seems to include QVCGP. There will be some unsecured recovery but I would speculate it will align with the 5-10% bone I mentioned before.

9) Do our current lenders own QVC Group? Who will own QVC Group at the conclusion of the
financial restructuring process?
• Until the conclusion of the process, our ownership will not change.
• Under the terms of the Restructuring Support Agreement, ownership of QVC Group will transition
to a group of our lenders, once the financial restructuring process has been completed.

14) What will the Company’s corporate and public company structure look like following
emergence from Chapter 11?
• Upon emergence, QVC, Inc. is expected to serve as the go-forward public company.
• The restructuring is expected to simplify the Company’s existing holding company structure.
• These steps are intended to streamline the organization and position the business for long-term
growth and profitability with a more sustainable capital structure.

15) What is happening to the preferred stock? Are those shares redeemable? Does this mean
dividends will never be reinstated?
• Under the RSA, upon approval of our restructuring plan, ownership of QVC Group will transition to
our lenders.
• We expect all outstanding shares of QVC Group’s equity to be extinguished when the financial
restructuring plan is consummated at the conclusion of the U.S. court-supervised process.
• We do not expect equity holders to receive any recovery at the end of the U.S. court-supervised
process, consistent with legal priorities.

16) What will happen to QVC Group’s common stock when the Company emerges from this
process? Will shareholders receive any recovery or compensation?
• Under the RSA, upon approval of our restructuring plan, ownership of QVC Group will transition to
our lenders.
• We expect all outstanding shares of QVC Group’s equity to be extinguished when the financial
restructuring plan is consummated at the conclusion of the U.S. court-supervised process.
• We do not expect equity holders to receive any recovery at the end of the U.S. court-supervised
process, consistent with legal priorities.

18) What will happen to QVC Group’s unsecured debt? Will the Company continue to make
interest payments on its unsecured debt?
• Holders of unsecured funded debt will receive recoveries in accordance with the terms of the plan
contemplated under the Restructuring Support Agreement.
• The Company does not anticipate making interest payments on account of its unsecured funded
debt during the Chapter 11 proceedings.

We will know more tomorrow.

Sean

[hunterdelarm] You did a good job sean. congrats!

hunterdelarm — 4/16/2026 8:10:45 PM

[Sean Collett] I made some edits to that last post but this pretty much confirms some of what I...

Sean Collett — 4/16/2026 8:02:50 PM

I made some edits to that last post but this pretty much confirms some of what I wrote over the last year:

" On April 16, 2026, QVC Group, together with certain of its direct and indirect subsidiaries, entered into the RSA with majority lender support. Pursuant to the RSA, QVC Group's principal amount of debt (as of December 31, 2025) will be reduced from approximately $6.6 billion to $1.3 billion, and the newly deleveraged company will emerge as Reorganized QVC, Inc."

They are emerging as a reorganized QVC, Inc according to the RSA release.

Sean

Edit:

Worth noting too this is pretty much what I called too. My original analysis (updated the multiples a bit) I estimated $1,050M would remain as debt and they are going to emerge with $1,300M of debt. The rest will become new equity in the QVC, Inc org.

Will need to see specifics of how this is split in court but regardless not too bad for a outsider swag.

Sean

[Sean Collett] QVC's first paperwork (form 201) has been filed in the Southern District of Texa...

Sean Collett — 4/16/2026 7:44:23 PM

QVC's first paperwork (form 201) has been filed in the Southern District of Texas.

Case: 26-90447 & 26-90446

Will officially be submitted as a prepackaged plan:

"WHEREAS, the Restructuring Support Agreement contemplates that the Companies will, among other things, each file a voluntary petition for relief under the provisions of chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and pursue confirmation and consummation of the Joint Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization of QVC Group, Inc. and Its Debtor Affiliates Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code"

Assets: $7,643,000
Debts: $10,660,000
Preferred Shares: 12,723,158
Class A: 7,911,869
Class B: 182,233

Interesting that QVC stated "QVC Group's international operations are not included in this process" which would have to impact the recoveries here. Rawlinson in a statement just now wrote " A stronger balance sheet, together with revenue growth from social and streaming, is expected to enable QVC Group to stabilize and return to sustainable growth over time." which is interesting given revenue had fallen pretty hard compared to where many expected it for Q4.

The names are redacted but it looks like John Malone had 7.7% of the class A shares and Maffei with 89.2% of the class B shares.

JPMorgan Chase is the lender for the DIP facility which will be the DIP LC Facility. They will have access up to $300M in this DIP LC Facility.

There are some significant trade claims that will be included here. For example

Procaps Labs has an unsecured claim of $10,359,081
Microsoft has an unsecured claim of $6,649,299.
Accenture International unsecured $6,407,956
C&J Clark America $6,272,640
John Hardy USA unsecured $5,035,062

In total I quickly count $93,034,900.00 in unsecured trade and supplier claims.

I cannot see a world in which equity gets anything looking at this. This all comes before the common equity

All parties that have filed within QVC Group:

This is only the first form and we need to see the actual first day motion. Overall I see zero recovery here for QVCGA. If they are filing as a consolidated entity this is a MOUNTAIN to climb.

The RSA states that "pursuant to the RSA, QVC Group's principal amount of debt (as of December 31, 2025) will be reduced from approximately $6.6 billion to $1.3 billion, and the newly deleveraged company will emerge as Reorganized QVC, Inc.".

In a simple view for this stack the priority is basically admin claims (lawyers and such) -> secured claims (DIP) -> senior notes -> senior unsecured notes -> trade claims -> common equity

I need to see the plan but if I had to speculate the seniors gave a bone (maybe 5-10%) to LITNA holders to buy in and then the rest gets crammed and zeroed out. I would be shocked if there was enough value at $755M EBITDA to even give 5% warrants to QVCGA holders. I mean $755M at even a GENEROUS 5x multiple is EV of $3,775M which against the reported debts leaves nothing for even QVCGP in the event a liquidation were to occur.

Hopefully the employees are able to continue on with no disruptions and keep their roles. Outside the investment world important to remember there are real people here and they have families. Hopfully the plan (should be released tomorrow) will give some insight and QVC can operate as a going concern.

Sean

[hunterdelarm] QVC finally filed. You were right.

hunterdelarm — 4/16/2026 7:38:01 PM

[hunterdelarm] I used to defend that statement "investing". I now realize the difference in the...

hunterdelarm — 4/16/2026 12:01:54 PM

I used to defend that statement "investing". I now realize the difference in the words gambling and investing are minimal. Each day we wake up is a gamble that it is our last on this Earth. We simply do the best we can to find the facts/truth and make decisions based on that and take new info into the equation/refine. It is gambling just an educated form of it.

Regardless this will be my final post for the world to see. QVC did not file BK

[Sean Collett] This is gambling and not investing. Please provide your analysis on this forum f...

Sean Collett — 4/16/2026 9:23:42 AM

This is gambling and not investing. Please provide your analysis on this forum for why you believe this increase is required. If you cannot then please post it elsewhere.

[hunterdelarm] and Sean this might be the last time I message you so if so I wish you well. I...

hunterdelarm — 4/16/2026 7:42:24 AM

and Sean this might be the last time I message you so if so I wish you well.

I have change my QVC positions: I have purchased an additional 900 shares to a total of 9,000.

[hunterdelarm] It truly does look bad Sean. Without doubt you are correct on this at this momen...

hunterdelarm — 4/15/2026 11:40:34 PM

It truly does look bad Sean. Without doubt you are correct on this at this moment. I give you applause for this. It seems there will be no white wizard at dawn.

[Sean Collett] QVC Group (QVCG) Earnings: Today QVC released their 10-K and I intend to addre...

Sean Collett — 4/15/2026 11:06:54 PM

QVC Group (QVCG) Earnings:

Today QVC released their 10-K and I intend to address the bankruptcy situation in a more dedicated post and leave this one 80% to earnings.

Revenue for QVCG declined -8% going from $10,037M in 2024 to $9,230M in 2025. EBITDA was $755M in 2025; this is a -29.5% decline in EBITDA compared to 2024 where they did $1,071M. This puts the QVCG EBITDA margin at 8.18%. To put this decline into perspective their EBITDA since 2019 has compounded at -14.68% and revenue at -4.88%.

FCF for QVCG was -$19M with core cash flow (before WC) at +$39M.

Inventroy turnover declined to 5.97x compared to 2024 where it was 6.2x and DIO increased to 61.18x compared to 58.88x in 2024.

Book value of -$3,017M.

QVC, Inc (OpCo) Earnings:

Revenue at OpCo declined 7.8% going from $8,997M in 2024 to $8,293M in 2025. I shared my model in the February 19th, 2026 consolidated Chapter 11 post I made and I had QxH revenue between $8,589.63M - $8,798.7m and with QxH coming in at $8,293M that is some massive downside. In fact since Q1 2023 these two models have not been off by this much so to see them off -3.45% to -5.75% is rather alarming.

In fact I just cannot stress enough how clear I was TikTok and social/streaming were not enough and it seems clear that the declines were far more severe than even I could model.

OpCo finished with EBITDA at $795M which is 26.3% lower than 2024 where they finished at $1,078M. I initially forecasted OpCo EBITDA to be around $850M - $900M so they ended up 6.5% - 11.7% lower than I forecasted. EBITDA margin for OpCo finished 2025 at 9.59%.

OpCo FCF was $150M with core FCF (before WC) at $256M which is positive to see.

Interesting though is inventory turnover for OpCo is 6.35x in 2025 compared to 6.71x in 2024; while lower than prior year it is higher than what we see at QVCG which indicates more likely the health declines of CBI. OpCo DIO increased though to 57.45x from 54.43x.

In this January 28th, 2026 post I forecasted advertising spend to increase by $80-90M in Q4. By their Q3 10-Q they had in nine months $201M for QxH ad spend and $228M total and in this 10-K they finished at $303M for QxH and $369M total which gives QxH a Q4 spend of $129M.

Chapter 11:
To confirm though their 10-K has stated they are filing Chapter 11 as I have been forecasting for over a year:

"On or about April 15, 2026 (the “Petition Date”), QVC Group and certain of its direct and indirect subsidiaries (excluding subsidiaries outside of the U.S. with the exception of one non-operating subsidiary in Luxembourg), including QVC Inc. (collectively, the “Company Parties”), intend to commence voluntary cases (the “Chapter 11 Cases”) under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas (the “Bankruptcy Court”). As of the Petition Date, we intend to operate our businesses as a debtor-in-possession under the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and orders of the Bankruptcy Court. QVC Group and QVC, Inc intend to request approval from the Bankruptcy Court for a variety of “first day” motions to continue their ordinary course operations during the Chapter 11 Cases. Although no assurance can be made as to a potential emergence date, QVC Group is targeting emergence from the Chapter 11 Cases within approximately 90 days.

Commencing the Chapter 11 Cases will constitute an event of default that accelerates the Company Parties’ respective obligations under (i) the 4.750% Senior Secured Notes due 2027 (the “2027 Notes”), 4.375% Senior Secured Notes due 2028 (the “2028 Notes”), 6.875% Senior Secured Notes due 2029 (the “2029 Notes”), 5.450% Senior Secured Notes due 2034 (the “2034 Notes”), 5.950% Senior Secured Notes due 2043 (the “2043 Notes”), 6.375% Senior Secured Notes due 2067 (the “2067 Notes”), and 6.250% Senior Secured Notes due 2068 (the “2068 Notes” and, together with the 2027 Notes, 2028 Notes, 2029 Notes, 2034 Notes, 2043 Notes and 2067 Notes, the “QVC Notes”), issued by QVC, (ii) the 3.75% senior unsecured exchangeable debentures due 2030, 4.00% senior unsecured exchangeable debentures due 2029, 8.25% senior unsecured debentures due 2030, and 8.50% senior unsecured debentures due 2029 (collectively, the “LINTA Notes”), issued by Liberty Interactive LLC (“LI LLC”) and (iii) that certain Fifth Amendment and Restatement Agreement dated as of October 27, 2021, by and among QVC and QVC Global Corporate Holdings, LLC, the lenders from time to time party thereto, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as administrative and collateral agent (the “Credit Agreement,” and the credit facility thereunder, the “Credit Facility”). The Credit Facility, together with the QVC Notes and LINTA Notes, are herein referred to as the “Debt Instruments”. The Credit Facility and the QVC Notes provide that, as a result of the Chapter 11 Cases, the principal and interest due thereunder shall be immediately due and payable. The exchangeable senior debentures provide that the amount accelerated is the greater of (x) the current principal amount of the exchangeable senior debentures or (y) the market value of the reference shares, plus all accrued and unpaid interest and all pass-through distributions due with respect to the reference shares shall be immediately due and payable. Any efforts to enforce such payment obligations under the Debt Instruments will be automatically stayed as a result of the Chapter 11 Cases, and the stakeholders’ rights of enforcement in respect of the Debt Instruments will be subject to the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including the Automatic Stay. Before the commencement of the Chapter 11 Cases, on or about April 15, 2026, QVC Group intends to enter into a Restructuring Support Agreement with certain holders of our Debt Instruments."

It appears they intend to exit after 90 days and seems they are jointly filing as part of their plan which I find interesting. The language though is pretty open though which is even more interesting as it's hard to tell if this is a legit prepack or if they're entering with some agreements with some holders but not all which still makes it a freefall risk.

They state that the DTL is not expected to materialize which was my view and why I was against any of the LME is the option and court won't work claims being made. A DTL is typically not a claim in court so this was the cleaner path:

"It is our tax position that certain deferred tax liabilities recorded on our financial statements as of December 31, 2025 will not materialize into a current tax liability because of the application of certain tax rules applicable to companies under the protection of a Bankruptcy court. While the Company believes its tax position is the correct interpretation of applicable law, there can be no guarantees, and there are no cases or other guidance beyond the applicable Treasury Regulations that directly address similar situations. Taxing authorities (including the Internal Revenue Service) therefore may disagree with this tax position. If a taxing authority were to successfully challenge this tax position, Reorganized QVC could incur a material current tax liability and significant costs in contesting or resolving any such challenge, which could adversely affect our liquidity and results from operations. "

I will review the court documents once they are posted and provide a more detailed analysis then.

As I wrote before, QVCGA is likely worth $0.00 and the MOS just was not there. Likely their plan will have then give equity control to creditors and current equity is cancelled out.
"Trading in our securities during the pendency of the Chapter 11 Cases is highly speculative and poses substantial risks. It is possible that our common stock will be cancelled pursuant to the Plan and holders of any such common stock will receive only such distributions as set forth in the Plan, which may result in such holders being unable to recover their investments."

and

"Trading in our securities during the pendency of the Chapter 11 Cases is highly speculative and poses substantial risks. Pursuant to the Plan, our capital stock is expected to be cancelled without recovery, which may result in such holders being unable to recover their investments. A significant amount of our indebtedness is senior to the capital stock in our capital structure. The Plan provides that these equity interests will be cancelled and extinguished on the Effective Date upon the approval of the Bankruptcy Court and the holders thereof would not be entitled to receive, and would not receive or retain, any property or interest in property on account of such equity interests. In the event of a cancellation of these equity interests, amounts invested by such holders in our outstanding equity securities will not be recoverable. Under the current Plan, holders of our common stock will not receive a recovery. However, even if our Plan is not approved, or the Effective Date does not occur, our currently outstanding common stock may have no value. Trading prices for our common stock are very volatile and may bear little or no relationship to the actual recovery, if any, by the holders of such securities in the Chapter 11 Cases. Accordingly, we urge that extreme caution be exercised with respect to existing and future investments in our equity securities and any of our other securities."

If we take OpCo $795M EBITDA and a 4x - 4.5x multiple (given the decline this isn't going for 5x EBTIDA) then EV is $3,180M - $3,577.50M and senior holders are deeply impaired. Given the level of impairment there is not enough to upstream anywhere else either.
Happy investing,

Sean

[hunterdelarm] [graphic]

hunterdelarm — 4/15/2026 8:38:27 PM

[hunterdelarm] youtube.com [graphic]

hunterdelarm — 4/15/2026 7:42:50 PM

youtube.com

[hunterdelarm] [graphic] youtube.com

hunterdelarm — 4/15/2026 7:10:18 PM

youtube.com

[hunterdelarm] Congrats Sean you were correct and I lost everything. I still need to read ever...

hunterdelarm — 4/15/2026 5:37:22 PM

Congrats Sean you were correct and I lost everything.

I still need to read everything but ch 11 is imminent

If you dont hear from me further then good luck in life.

[sixty2nds] Sean... I'm still holding my QCPGP which is bleeding out. My best guess is my ...

sixty2nds — 4/13/2026 2:11:22 PM

Sean...

I'm still holding my QCPGP which is bleeding out.

My best guess is my low cost basis after Dividends
MIGHT
let me Breakeven.

Let's just say...
I do not have the confidence to throw some cash at lowering that cost basis.

Lets not forget the longer this takes the more expensive it becomes.

The longer the restructure takes the greater the chances are of a Chapter 11 filing.

I see people banking on a Tariff refund.

I see ZERO chance of that happening in 2026.

Safe Travels!
60

[Sean Collett] Hello Martin, I am traveling so below is my quick response. I am not sure I agr...

Sean Collett — 4/13/2026 1:51:59 PM

Hello Martin,

I am traveling so below is my quick response.
I am not sure I agree as this is a time constraint issue and the risk flows into the banks to carry before and after LME. The question should be when does QVC see the boom in revenue from TikTok? When does the conversion occur and what's the delta between first buy and conversion? Is it slower? Is it faster? Is profile the same?

I already shared enough on the LME and why I am not sure the credit agreement opens the door as some write and the post-LME math itself can almost offset any benefit too. LME is not close to my base case and no TikTok data counters that.

<<Historically, QVC has been strong at turning new customers into loyal, high-margin repeat buyers.>>
Comparing two different distribution paths. Their prior model was they paid the cable distribution fees and then grabbed eyeballs via loyal channel watchers. Hosts would be on at similar times and customer behaviors were more predictable and they built relationships directly with the host.

For TikTok I believe everything I have shared here indicates this distribution path is not the same and thus one should not expect similar customer behaviors. My thoughts:

QVC use to own their TV channel(s) and now do not own their spot on TikTok as it's algorithm driven. I can swipe up and I am on a competitor shop. This is built on how much they are willing to turn the valve to flow money into customer acquisition. If you have a Harry's Razer spending $150K on an FTE to do nothing more than drive TikTok shop this erodes the QVC MOAT as more players enter to space. The recent NetInfluencer report also indicates that you have a Shark Home who arrived, spent money, and took shop position over QVC. Does it continue? Who can say but the point is this is a pay-to-play arena not built on loyalty.
QVC is not building a direct relationship with the customer anymore via hosts; the customer is building one with an affiliate channel that happens to sell a product on the QVC Shop. That affiliate likely also sells other shop products too and not just from QVC.

I think those two points are bigger than some think. QVC doesn't own their channel anymore and they don't own their hosts and thus don't own their customers. Given they never owned the product either I find the loss of those other two points to make them an even bigger middleman in 2026.

If one goes back to 2012 and thinks about Scrub Daddy what was the story? A one-product SKU that couldn't get "dump" space on a store floor but was able to get onto TV and boomed. For Scrub Daddy to do what they did in 2012 they would need massive TV fees for ad space, the viewership to that channel(s), someone who can vCom sell and keey eyes on the channel, and all the other things. 2026 they just need a phone and you can setup a mock studio (some of these channels are selling from their kitchen with a ring light....). Crocs is all over TikTok doing this today and it's clear others are getting on board.

Whatnot is even selling on TikTok too which is interesting. If that company can scale to $1B in revenue with less leverage overhang and is also selling on the same platform as QVC then I see less MOAT here.

It's very possible the CAC remains high on TikTok given the nature of the distribution platform. The amount of coupons and discount offers I get on TikTok indicate they are willing to erode their margins to gain volume which supports that the current 11% EBITDA margin (average since 2022) is likely to hold unless something changes.

Not to mention none of this LME talk addresses the points on the banks and what incentive they have given they appear to be the roadblock. I have broken the LME math down and even the risk of debt repricing on rolling over the RCF too that an LME may not create the value some are hoping for.

<<Under that assumption, do you see any realistic scenario in which an LME could work — or do you still see the probability as effectively zero?>>
I think an LME does not work because I cannot get the incentives nor the math to align. You also would need to see the growth on TikTok accelerate much faster than it is and it's rather stagnant compared to recent trends.

Since April 6th, 2025 I have QVC TikTok at $121.78M - $148.84M based on the update from April 11th, 2026. I started tracking HSN recently based on it looked like it was growing but even that has gone back down and past 11-12 days they haven't cracked 1K per day. In total then I have $125.76M - $153.71M in gross revenue which is in total 1.40% - 1.71% of QVC annual revenue from 2024. If you factor an average return rate (could be +/- for TiKTok) of 14.5% then gross sales drop to $107.53M - $131.42M and with EBITDA margin at 11% that's $11.83M - $14.46M EBITDA impact which is not a scale to give creditors much buffer. At a 50% cash flow-to-EBTIDA conversion to this is $4.14M - $5.06M of core cash.

The marketing customer numbers may be attractive, but to me it's marketing. They have been growing customers via TikTok since April 2025 and yet revenue does not seem to be changing. Their own NT 10-K states "As previously disclosed in each of the Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q for the periods ended March 31, June 30 and September 30, 2025, the Company has reported declining revenues as compared to the same periods in 2024." so again what's the delta? Or is every new customer requiring the same level of effort to keep?

<<If that dynamic were to materialize, even partially, for the TikTok cohort, then I could see an LME potentially being a viable way to buy time and stabilize the customer base.>>
This isn't a view for creditors IMO but for the company.

We're well over 12 months into this too as the original banking discussions started Q4 2024 and news went public on legal teams around May 2025. The timeline + everything else I have shared here, for over a year, does not give me any reason to change my analysis: LME is not a base case and a Chapter 11 is and has been for over a year.

The current trends continue to support this base case of Chapter 11 too.

My question back to you is if you believe an LME is higher probability then how do you see it playing out? I have given a few views on why I don't see it. The issue is the banks have $2,900M loaned out so what benefit does taking out bonds termed out 2034+ do? The banks now have less cash recovery, watched pari notes walk, and have to wait out this conversion - this is not how banks traditionally work and violates a few risk profiles so why do you see an LME working? The other challenge is what A&E cash restrictions come into play and suffocate HoldCo/ParCo? Then if company tries to raise new paper to term revolver as I wrote to Hunter the coupon will eat any LME interest reductions.

If I take a distressed playbook here then the creditors take the OpCo equity in court and the clean balance gives notes new equity in NewCo and banks can be bought out and/or fund the new RCF for NewCo and then the NewCo operates as a going concern. Even with the secular decline the clean balance sheet, lower interest expense, reduced tax risk, no parent cash dividend, and various other things allow the NewCo holders to have flexibility to navigate and drive organic growth and also drive bolt-on's to grow EBITDA and then potentially flip in 2-3 for a much higher IRR/MOIC. In fact, if what you indicate is even true it's more incentive for creditors to NOT take a haircut.
Since I see little drop-down/uptier flexibility here (as I wrote and shared why) I am not sure what else is driving an LME. The banks don't have incentive to watch cash recoveries go to pari long-duration notes + absorb 100% EBITDA risk and the notes likely see a higher IRR as going concern.

I wouldn't put any money into an equity position as I see < 5% probability there is any equity recovery here. There just isn't a MOS in this company.

If I am wrong then I lost nothing except making a wrong call, but if I am right? This is a probability game at this point and each new dataset tilts the probability scale closer to Chapter 11. The Harvard research I shared that came out in January 2026 supports most of the LME statements I have made specifically regarding QVC too.

QVCGA is likely worth $0.00 and is a call option today. From my lens too much downside risk to make taking the counter side worth the return. Since I flipped from owning QVCGA, most of this has headed where I thought anyway which further enforces my probability of Chapter 11 and if the data flipped so would I, but it isn't.

Happy investing,

Sean

[Jupitermaehre1] Hi Sean, Thank you for your detailed response and the transparent assessment. ...

Jupitermaehre1 — 4/13/2026 12:07:56 PM

Hi Sean,

Thank you for your detailed response and the transparent assessment. Regarding the financials and the overall situation you outlined, I don’t disagree – I don’t have a different view on the numbers.

Where I do see some remaining probability, however, is regarding whether an LME could be viable if QVC succeeds in converting the new customers acquired via TikTok in 2025 into valuable recurring customers. Historically, QVC has been strong at turning new customers into loyal, high-margin repeat buyers.

If that dynamic were to materialize, even partially, for the TikTok cohort, then I could see an LME potentially being a viable way to buy time and stabilize the customer base.

I’d be curious to hear your view:

Under that assumption, do you see any realistic scenario in which an LME could work — or do you still see the probability as effectively zero?

Thanks
Martin

[hunterdelarm] Notable jump in recent sales. [graphic]

hunterdelarm — 4/13/2026 11:36:27 AM

Notable jump in recent sales.

[hunterdelarm] On TT: yes I see the data. yes it bothers me. However QVC was listed as #5 on th...

hunterdelarm — 4/11/2026 8:37:23 PM

On TT: yes I see the data. yes it bothers me. However QVC was listed as #5 on the daily and #8 on the monthly. As long as total TT sales grow and as long as QVC can stay around then they benefit tremendously. I recall David talking about China and how if USA can get just a % of that and if QVC can get a % of that it would be fruitful.

On LME: I worry that the appetite to want to work with a company that engages in LME tactics will spook everyone and no new bonds are agreed on for many years. I worry QVC is backed into a corner of either diluting to gain money or taking on high interest loans from banks (they smell blood). But I also remember that QVC does not have a lot of core/physical/fire sale assets. As long as they have a decent amount of debt above liquidation value with the banks then it is in banks best interest to work with QVC. The banks do not want to lose 1-2 billion and/or take ownership in a retail company that is in a very niche area.

I am not sure what a post LME revolver set up will look like. QVC just might get a decent rate/deal (as TJ noted much lower cap) and walk away better than ever.

And thank goodness b/c I cannot stand reading 10k/Q of a company I am not interested in. I only gain interest if I like the products/services or find interesting market data to help support an investment... I like to look at entire business segments facing massive headwinds like food mfg are right now.

Oh and I admit that one of the most useful books (for me) in understanding money flow/how the fed works was a DK book on money. I am not afraid to admit that I am a dummy at times and that book was very interesting and digestible to read. amazon.com

[Sean Collett] Hi Hunter, << do we have data on post LME companies with respect on their abili...

Sean Collett — 4/11/2026 8:05:23 PM

Hi Hunter,

<< do we have data on post LME companies with respect on their ability to obtain new debt for growth/business expansion needs?>>
In theory a company could attempt to raise debt immediately post-LME depending on post-covenant restrictions. The challenge would be what is the appetite for the markets to buy. If we take this back to QVC, which is what I assume if driving this question, they would still have $2,900M of bank debt that would come with a much higher coupon and that's a cold debt reality.

Their rating is currently CCC and ICE BofA has CCC effective yield at 13.34% and the option-adjusted spread at 9.46%. I have modeled before I do not see a rate coming in lower than 10-11% for them and more so after an LME. In fact post an LME at such magnitude as some write would likely see a punishing yield.

Current revolver costs $171.1M in annual interest and all senior notes are $132.08M for a total interest of $303.18M. Let's assume they magically take out all the senior notes (extremely low probability but playing along) which removed $132.08M annually but they will need to term that revolver down immediately. The banks themselves will come in with a higher rate and anyone arguing different needs to justify how because the risk is owned by the banks. The company is not close to showing they are fending off any secular decline which further squeezes the banks who watched their capital allow pari passu and long duration debt walk today.

To summarize this point home I want to be clear the company has not made friends with the banks over last few years. Since December 2021 the banks have watched their exposure go from 9.5% to 57.7% and post this magical LME they are now 100%. They own the secular decline and all the risk and also just watched the company burn cash (the banks cash) to pay off pari passu holders which effectively lowers the banks real cash recoveries. The risk profile here is enormous.

If the same lenders that Maffei partners with for SIRI just added this for SIRI what do you think they will do to a CCC rated post-LME QVC?

"On August 20, 2025, Sirius XM Radio LLC entered into an amendment to, among other things, increase the Credit Facility to $2,000 and extend its maturity to August 31, 2030. Sirius XM Radio LLC’s obligations under the Credit Facility are guaranteed by certain of its material domestic subsidiaries, including Pandora and its subsidiaries, and by Sirius XM Inc. and are secured by a lien on substantially all of Sirius XM Radio LLC’s assets and the assets of its material domestic subsidiaries. Borrowings bear interest at the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”) plus an applicable rate determined by Sirius XM Radio LLC’s debt to operating cash flow ratio, and we pay a variable commitment fee on unused commitments of 0.25% per annum as of December 31, 2025. The amendment also adds a springing maturity feature which will automatically accelerate the maturity date of the Credit Facility to a date 91 days prior to the stated maturity of certain of Sirius XM Radio LLC’s long-term debt instruments, including Sirius XM Radio LLC’s 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029 and 2030 Senior Notes and the Delayed Draw Incremental Term Loan, if at such date Sirius XM Radio LLC does not have sufficient liquidity to repay the maturing obligations. Liquidity for this test is defined as the sum of (i) unrestricted cash and cash equivalents and (ii) available borrowing capacity under the Credit Facility. "

If the revolver and/or new paper issuance comes in at 10-11%, which is deserved given credit rating is still CCC, coupled with secular decline and post-LME moves, then total interest goes to $290M - $319M from $303.18M where they save ~$13.18M in interest annually (marginal improvement) to increasing interest at $15.82M. If the new rate comes in higher then this was a beyond wasteful move.....beyond wasteful. My point before that interest expense isn't the problem but the secular decline and now the bank maturity.

Any new paper is not going to see duration 10+ years out either it will be at most 2-3 years given the LME tactics used, secular decline, AND any new indentures will ensure creditors are protected. This means they run the risk of being right back here in a few years anyway which then supports my view that LME's buy time. In fact that statement is rather supported by that Harvard/SSRN paper I linked showing most LME's end in a default and/or bankruptcy anyway.

How do you see the above playing out? From my view the company burned cash to reduce principal but in the end likely is paying close to the same if not more in interest and still has a duration issue. In my view now and since early 2025 an LME never made sense for QVC. The company has been using their credit facility and exchange tactics to pay down debt and extend maturities and yet here we still are.

And the reality is the above would be the perfect LME scenario too in which all senior notes are gone. There are seven tranches here and given the duration spread there will be differing desires for outcomes. The probability they make a successful move OOC is so low that I wouldn't be putting my capital on this hope.

Obtaining new debt for growth is not even something I would consider at this stage unless data came and supported.

Quick TikTok update:
One thing I just came across is this report from NetInfluencer.com which stated:

"Revenue: $12.67m | Growth: -25% | Items Sold: 248.37k: QVC, Inc. drops from No. 3 in February to No. 6 in March, recording a -25% revenue decline from $14.35m to $12.67m. QVC held the top shop position in both October and November 2025 and had not fallen below third place in recent months before this drop. The -25% growth rate is among the steeper declines in the current top ten. " and " March 2026 brings the most significant structural shift in the shop rankings since November 2025. Shark Home’s debut at No. 2 with an 108.2% growth rate, combined with the brand’s two product placements in the product chart, marks its strongest month across both rankings categories in the dataset. Dr.Melaxin’s fall to third ends a four-month run at the top. medicube leads by total revenue despite a negative growth rate, while Tarte Cosmetics records the largest absolute revenue gain among returning top-five shops. QVC’s drop from third to sixth is its sharpest positional decline since October 2025, when it also held the top position before losing ground."

I have never been one to buy into their place on the shop but I do think this highlights what I have been stating forever in that TikTok is not a loyal space. It is an algorithm pay-to-play space and if Shark Home can debut and get right at #2 it should highlight that there is a cost to play here.

For what it's worth too I had QVC specific TikTok transactions at 300K (on February 26th, 2026 they were at 2,600K and March 30th at 2,900K so not exact given when the platform updates) and at the $45 ATV I had them at $13.5M so a bit over. Just stating this as we debated prior if my ATV was off but continues to seem to hold in the Q1-Q3 levels as last year.

If we take that $12.67M and adjust for returns it's going to likely be closer to $10.83M which would give $1.19M of EBITDA impact for March and $0.6M of core cash flow (being generous with the 50% conversion).

<< One more question/general question: do you put much time into reviewing broad market charts/sales data?>>
Yes. I review everything I can that catches my interest. I am reading and consuming information constantly.

<< I do not think I would enjoy reading 1,000 10k/q or a "shotgun" approach. I enjoy reading graphs/macro/getting ideas then discovering a company from there. Maybe that is "wrong">>
There is no wrong here and each investor needs to do what they feel gives them the edge. I believe your statement is in response to a recent Burry post where he did this, but I also believe he was using this as a broader analysis for his SBC post. He's also just built different and so it works for him.

Hope the above answers your questions.

Happy investing,
Sean

[hunterdelarm] Hey Sean, do we have data on post LME companies with respect on their ability t...

hunterdelarm — 4/11/2026 6:05:02 PM

Hey Sean,

do we have data on post LME companies with respect on their ability to obtain new debt for growth/business expansion needs?

Would it take many years until new bonds could be issued? Would a company be forced into using only bank debt? Does this come across your thoughts?

One more question/general question: do you put much time into reviewing broad market charts/sales data? Like for example if I showed you hamburger sandwich sales over time in USA would this be value to you? I enjoy reading these kinds of things and it helps me get investment ideas

I do not think I would enjoy reading 1,000 10k/q or a "shotgun" approach. I enjoy reading graphs/macro/getting ideas then discovering a company from there. Maybe that is "wrong"

[Sean Collett] Hello Martin, Welcome! From my view in the current state the probability is lo...

Sean Collett — 4/10/2026 9:09:01 PM

Hello Martin,

Welcome!

From my view in the current state the probability is low (<5%) that there is equity value in the current state. I have written and believe the highest probability is OpCo creditors will likely take control of OpCo equity in a Chapter 11 proceeding.

I have broken the LME math down in prior posts and I simply do not see the case for an LME, especially one that is done where the banks see their own capital (75% of this cash is borrowed) used to pay off pari passu holders that have duration past 2034 and allow them to exit today....even at a discount. This would seem to violate the risk profile of banking lenders.

Any debt-for-debt exchange would seem unlikely too because a good portion of this debt isn't due until 2034+ and carries an average coupon of 6.01%. Any exchange would reduce principal but pull a chunk of duration forward and given the capital markets today + their CCC rating would likely come with a higher coupon. This higher coupon is enough to likely offset any principal reduction plus increases risk by pulling duration forward. The terms of the new paper would also have to be super enticing to drive the exchange and what does QVC have to offer? All the OpCo debt is pledged with the OpCo equity and the company is asset light already.

As I wrote to others here there is likely value in OpCo as a going concern. If we take a modern distressed debt situation then we can look at OpCo and see massively reduced debt as it's converted to new equity and thus interest expense is also significantly reduced, the parent dividend to QVC Group is gone so all that cash stays home, and the new owners can put themselves as board memebers of NewCo and instill a new management team that can drive organic growth and/or drive bolt-ons that improve EBITDA and in 2-3 years sell the company for a higher IRR/MOIC. Important to remember there are 3ish boxes here and I am talking about OpCo which I believe can self-file Chapter 11 and regardless I find it low probability even if they all filed at the same time that a judge would consolidate into one entity which further supports my thesis here.

The interest expense isn't really a problem today so I am unsure why most keep even focusing on a bond driven LME. It also doesn't help the banks. As I wrote prior the banks have $2,900M exposed and have watched their share of exposure grow significantly since 2021. Since December 2021 their share of debt went from 9.5% to 57.7% as of September 2025 (now April 2026) and the outstanding principal is not really any lower.

The bonds walk and the banks now carry all the risk. If an OOC A&E were to occur there would be tighter cash covenants in a new extension that likely create HoldCo/ParCo risks. The banks #1 goal will be seeing their risk reduced immediately. The company could then attempt to issue new paper but again getting $2,900M of new paper on the market after just screwing bonds and expecting friendly duration & interest seems low probability. Not to mention there are seven tranches of senior notes today and hard to really model who owns each block and how much is actually reduced (I attempted in a few posts but that's a guess as best).

I will say I see a few folks write that banks want to avoid court and while that's true they also mainly want to reduce risk and right now QVC has put them in a bad spot. There are many cases where banks led the charge into court if they believe recoveries are higher and/or they gain better control if the debtor is not acting in best interests.

<< that the company could still emerge from an LME process with a positive outcome for equity holders.>>
If the company were to perform an LME that would be of course a different story, but I wouldn't place my capital on this probability. I have modeled the math and it just doesn't make sense given QVC has been buying time using their credit facility and exchange offers since 2023-2024. The situation has not improved.

<< More specifically: do you see any realistic scenario in which existing equity is preserved or regains value, potentially leading to a significant increase in the share price?>>
No. I believe my writing has been clear on this as the modeling I have done does not support such a value. Equity today is a call option at best.

<< Additionally: do you see any potential for a short-term price spike if Q4 results were to come in better than expected – for example, with a smaller decline in sales, stronger OIBDA, or better free cash flow than the market currently anticipates?>>
Anything is possible and I don't concern myself with those price movements. June 4th, 2025 equity bottomed out at $2.27/s and the rallied to a high of $15.48/s by October 10th, 2025 - there was no news driving this. Could the equity see some bump? Sure. Does it change anything for me? No, not unless there is a material fundamental update.

I am not married to any thesis and will put my money where the opportunity is. QVCGA is a call option that requires a strong narrative to believe it can/will survive. I was once a buyer of QVCGA but adjusted my view as the data no longer supported that thesis.

If you believe an LME is likely how do you see that playing out? How much principal is reduced and really what options do the banks give them? What would the per share equity value be in that case?

Happy investing,
Sean

[Jupitermaehre1] Hello Sean, I’ve been following your analysis on QVC (QVCGA), and I find your ...

Jupitermaehre1 — 4/10/2026 8:32:22 PM

Hello Sean,

I’ve been following your analysis on QVC (QVCGA), and I find your data-driven approach particularly compelling. You’ve taken a clear position that there is currently no remaining equity value. I would be interested in how you assess the probability – or whether you effectively see it as zero – that the company could still emerge from an LME process with a positive outcome for equity holders.

More specifically: do you see any realistic scenario in which existing equity is preserved or regains value, potentially leading to a significant increase in the share price?

Additionally: do you see any potential for a short-term price spike if Q4 results were to come in better than expected – for example, with a smaller decline in sales, stronger OIBDA, or better free cash flow than the market currently anticipates?

Thank you in advance for your perspective
Martin

[hunterdelarm] I have nothing to hide. I have lost a huge amount of my wealth on this investmen...

hunterdelarm — 4/7/2026 5:28:29 PM

I have nothing to hide. I have lost a huge amount of my wealth on this investment. I am thankful to those that helped show me the path and will be in their debt for the rest of my life. I made the choice to walk this path and right now I feel the end is near.

[hunterdelarm] " Investing should not solicit any feeling. Emotion does an investor very lit...

hunterdelarm — 4/7/2026 3:14:20 PM

" Investing should not solicit any feeling. Emotion does an investor very little good."

I am a human trying to make decisions based around other human decisions. Of course I am emotional. I do not fear being emotional in fact I try to tap into it. We must not fear what we are but try to control it and use it for our advantage.

"Well it's not 2012 but 2026 so we're down the road"

I agree... this has been a long time coming

"why did they not jump further into social streaming back in 2019?"

Well they were on youtube and they were trying. They did not have all the answers. They are making mistakes and pivoting where needed. Apple did not create the first cell phone yet they pivoted when needed and look what they became. You do not have to be first.

I would rather invest everything into QVC and be wrong because of a 1% event happening then to invest in a darling and hope for a 1% event happening

[Sean Collett] Hello Hunter, <
Sean Collett — 4/7/2026 2:52:45 PM
Hello Hunter,

<<To anyone that is fearful let us not forget this quote that TJ found:>>
If one is fearful then one has made too high an allocation. Investing should not solicit any feeling. Emotion does an investor very little good.

Process is key and it's best to develop one, Hunter.

A Greg Maffei quote from 2012 is irrelevant in my view. I can post numerous quotes too that somewhat fit any situation. It's like taking something from the bible and spinning it to fit whatever you want it to mean but it strips it from the entire context.

"Somewhere down the road, there's likely some sort of dislocation that presents more opportunities. And we hope we keep our nerve, and invest then. That's the challenge - invest on the cannons and sell on the trumpets. We want to be investing when things are rough." - Greg Maffei

How do you see that exact quote applying to QVC? Somewhere down the road? Well it's not 2012 but 2026 so we're down the road. What opportunities exist? I had EBITDA trending towards $850M for 2025 which is a steep decline and cash flows Q1-Q3 were negative. TikTok I have broken down numerous times and is not scaling fast enough to matter before October 2026 and runway doesn't look to show significant change by October 2027.

I also challenge the management track record in recent years is not as great as some are making them out to be. There is almost a dietification happening for Greg Maffei and John Malone that is interesting to observe.

Perhaps one could argue QVC was split off as its own company knowing it was a dying brand and was meant as nothing more than to milk the last amount of oil from the well before she dries up while not spreading toxicity to their core balance sheets? In this case your trust in said managers would be misplaced.

Comcast did something not too long ago with VSNT.

No way to know for sure, but that is a counter to consider.

<<Stand tall for we have managers that think long term. Soon the sun will shine on us again.>>
If they thought long-term why did they not jump further into social streaming back in 2019? It was well documented cord cutting was happening and they did nothing to pivot and diversify the business. TikTok was a delayed reaction and while Rocky likely helped they could have jumped in 2020/2021 when TikTok was booming and been a pioneer as Rocky didn't occur until December 2021. I am unsure they think long-term strategy wise.

Instead of investing cash flows into growing QVC they burned it on stock buybacks in 2020 or so and then via their own comp packages diluted shareholders and negated the entire buyback. Then went and paid themselves $53M by converting RSU's into cash. This of course at the same time they paid out millions by issuing QVCGP out of nothing. I mean they burned cash on QVCGP dividends until May 2025 well after the point of no return. Why not invest that cash, all of it, into buying something and diversifying long ago?

This is all of course my own speculation, but the above is all from their own filings and investor decks and clear lack of action, so I guess my way of saying I disagree with these takes, Hunter.

Sorry for the bluntness, but this is a stock forum to discuss stocks. If you're going to post these things then I will give you my analysis based on what I see. I do think you are far too invested in this company, Hunter.

It's very likely a Chapter 11 case. I am unsure without a counter analysis what you hope to achieve by posting here. I am not sure anyone posting/lurking on this old site agrees the sun will shine on QVCGA holders.

If you have a revenue pathway, modeling, or something else that counters I am all for it. This quote does not support much for QVC specifically.

Sean

[hunterdelarm] To anyone that is fearful let us not forget this quote that TJ found: Stand tal...

hunterdelarm — 4/7/2026 2:21:53 PM

To anyone that is fearful let us not forget this quote that TJ found:

Stand tall for we have managers that think long term. Soon the sun will shine on us again.

[hunterdelarm] I wish you well too. I do appreciate you even if I disagree with you. You have a...

hunterdelarm — 4/6/2026 9:44:53 PM

I wish you well too. I do appreciate you even if I disagree with you. You have a gift and maybe our paths cross someday again.

[Sean Collett] <
Sean Collett — 4/6/2026 7:40:39 PM
<<You are very negative on QVC and you discount the ability of a company to act during times of great calamity>>

I was once bullish. Those posts are permanently here. I cannot edit them. I have also shared extensive analysis of my own upon changing my original wrong view. Tons of data shared. If I am negative it is because the data doesn't support. If the data presented a different picture my stance would evolve.

I have nothing more to discuss with you.

The thing you fail to grasp is my ego isn't hurt if I am wrong; I will analyze what I missed and adjust. The game is about a margin of safety though. If the math doesn't support it then there's no margin of safety. And respectfully to you, I know a thing or two and you admitted you don't. How can you even state I am negative when you apparently don't even fullyunderstand each layer? Am I negative or is the company in a negative state in which my view is a reflection of this state?

I wish you the best in your investment, Hunter. We see things drastically different here.

Sean

[hunterdelarm] I admit I do not fully understand each layer to this onion. I admit it was too r...

hunterdelarm — 4/6/2026 7:30:15 PM

I admit I do not fully understand each layer to this onion. I admit it was too risky to invest over half my wealth (well.... somehow my pokemon card collection... now represents nearly half my wealth due to incredible bubble and getting smoked by QVC fall) into this stock.

I admit I do not understand everything about one thing even hormesis. I do not have all the answers but I have enough to point me in the right direction.

Investing is not pure science. Newton did not predict black holes but he was absolutely on the right path. We cannot know everything so we have to use current understanding to take us as far as possible. You are very negative on QVC and you discount the ability of a company to act during times of great calamity

Even the great Euler could not see everything (although he would argue his performance increased after going blind " Now I will have fewer distractions ")

[Sean Collett] Again my math aligned pretty close to Lee so nothing to debate in my eyes. HSN T...

Sean Collett — 4/6/2026 7:16:51 PM

Again my math aligned pretty close to Lee so nothing to debate in my eyes. HSN TikTok is back to under 1K per day and last 11 days or so QVC averaged 9.1K per day so you're massively jumping the gun. Prior to those 11 days they averaged 8.3K per day over 12 days.

100,000K per day is a ridiculous number, Hunter. You're cashing winnings that don't even exist. From 10K daily average thats a 900% increase for a 10x improvement. It's massive. Your own screenshot literally shows the margin erosion already happening. I see constant discounts to buy on their TikTok too so the CAC is constant meaning I don't see margin relief on this platform either.

My own modeling was hypothetical and I treated it as such.

Right now they're offering 50% for new customers:

And I see similar stuff constantly - here's a 40% off. These are constant.

I just can't buy into this narrative but you need it to work so can't really debate that. I hope I am wrong and you get your $1.4B.

Changes absolutely nothing I see. Equity is impaired and worth $0.00 and is a call option.

Sean

P.S.

<<We are talking about a micro company here.>>
In equity value. Not in enterprise value. It's a micro because it's a Chapter 11 candidate so equity is priced to cleaned out.

The micro point is not valid when analyzing a distressed company.

[hunterdelarm] "we're debating $10 or so in value here?" Yes we are. that is huge. 100k transa...

hunterdelarm — 4/6/2026 6:58:58 PM

"we're debating $10 or so in value here?"

Yes we are. that is huge. 100k transactions a day 365 days a year = 1.4 billion at $40 vs 1.8 billion at $50

We are talking about a micro company here. Each million let alone hundreds of millions of revenue matter

[Sean Collett] What am I reviewing? I explained that ave sale and ave transaction (multiple i...

Sean Collett — 4/6/2026 6:02:27 PM

What am I reviewing?

I explained that ave sale and ave transaction (multiple items which can drop average) are not the same. And I am fully aware of what you shared with me, I track that too every quarter. I also track a few other things like value per customer which has gotten worse over time:

Can you please share some context on why you believe I need to review this?

It also doesn't seem to change my math much at all either. Lee on X shared (interesting he stopped sharing the daily updates on QxH as Chapter 11 now seems more likely) what Fastmoss had for Q4 revenue and it aligned close with what I had posted; he's tracking average sale via Fastmoss and I am tracking average transaction.He started at October 18th, 2025 and had QVC total around $52.2M and then figured from Oct 1 - Oct 17th maybe another $5M for QVC brining the Q4 to $57.2M for Q4.

I have Q4 starting (October 1st, 2025) at 1,100K transactions and by December 31st, 2025 they ended around 2,200K which gets them 1,100K total Q4 2025. If we use my average $45.00 ATV that's $49.5M. Now you can +/- that ATV a bit and I gave them a Q4 range of $49M - $58M for Q4 as I posted here on January 4th, 2026. Lee is a bit higher but I also gave a range for Q4 knowing the ATV was likely higher than what I had used. Otherwise I am not seeing a drastic difference between what he got from Fastmoss and what I modeled.

That stated the average you shared is also historical QVC spend via traditional purchasing methods and may or may not align with what TikTok and other social streaming bring in. Something to consider.

Regardless, we're debating $10 or so in value here? This doesn't change the math in a significant way. TiKTik still presents as a rounding error currently.

Happy investing,

Sean

[hunterdelarm] Wait a second. I knew this did not sound right. Per QVC own data the avg sale pr...

hunterdelarm — 4/6/2026 5:10:08 PM

Wait a second. I knew this did not sound right. Per QVC own data the avg sale price per last year was in the $50 range. They already are in the $50 range.

@sean (idk how to @ people on this site) I think you need to review this

[hunterdelarm] Either way I have lost nearly everything on this up to this so no point in selli...

hunterdelarm — 4/2/2026 7:04:50 PM

Either way I have lost nearly everything on this up to this so no point in selling now/might as well see what happens. I appreciate your thoughts on all this and currently you are correct.

[Sean Collett] I buy widget A for $60 and that's a sale. A transaction can have multiple items ...

Sean Collett — 4/2/2026 6:12:36 PM

I buy widget A for $60 and that's a sale. A transaction can have multiple items or can be the aggregate for the spend.

When my spectrum was really spectruming two weeks ago I went through 120+ items on the QVC Shop best seller list and put together a list based on the price and quantity sold. Here is the top 20:

The top 10 items have an average sale price of $27.99 and top 20 are $46.69. Of the full 120+ item list I tracked the average is $54.18.

Again we're talking two different metrics. FWIW Lee on X gave what his Q4 TikTok revenue was from Fastmoss and it was with the higher sale number you used and it aligned pretty darn close to me using my $45 ATV and that's without me ever touching Fastmoss.

Regardless if I go with your model you gave me of $5,000M of revenue total that's $550M EBITDA and that supports and enterprise value of $2,750M which puts the equity under water. There is not a margin of safety here.

Is there potential in the social side of this? Yes, and that's exactly why I stated I see this going to Chapter 11.

Sean

[hunterdelarm] How can avg transaction be lower than average sale? that doesn't make sense to m...

hunterdelarm — 4/2/2026 6:01:54 PM

How can avg transaction be lower than average sale? that doesn't make sense to me.

Either way I am seeing this one to the end.

[Sean Collett] QVC does not offer a unique experience and I have also addressed that a half-doz...

Sean Collett — 4/2/2026 5:52:13 PM

QVC does not offer a unique experience and I have also addressed that a half-dozen times too.

What did QVC offer prior to 2019? It was a unique vCom shopping experience. It required someone who could fund television licensees, pay for qualified hosts, cameras, lighting, studios, distribution, customer support to handle transactions and returns, and have a deep network of companies that wanted to sell their products. It was the perfect spot for a Scrub Daddy because the marketing expense to do what QVC could do would be insane for a single product company.

That is simply not the case anymore. Go look at any live stream today and they all have the same feel to them. I am on TikTok and can see they all look/feel the same.

In this modern approach to vCom the TV licenses are gone because reach can be made on TikTok, Instagram, and multiple other platforms. I mean seeing Whatnot sprout up and reach almost $1B as fast as they have is clear the barrier to entry is low.

Expensive cameras, studios, and lighting? Gone. Replaced with someone livestreaming from their phone in their bedroom, kitchen, or a small mock studio.

Expensive hosts? Gone. The rise of affiliate marketing has eroded this. QVC doesn't need a David Venable because they can grab multiple of him. The problem here is the same as before though in that the customer builds a relationship with the affiliate host and QVC does not "own" them the way they did with David. Most of these affiliate hosts also sell other products and most are not QVC exclusive.

Annnnnnddd as I already wrote to you:

" "It is also worth noting the scale of TikTok. I see a few write that it is only QVC that is capable of competing here but the comparison is against Amazon or Walmart and those are not the heavyweights here. TikTok is a pay-to-play algorithm driven shopping environment that gives many the access that QVC has. I believe this diminishes the MOAT that many think QVC has.

I wrote a few weeks ago "it was reported by Wired in Q3 2025 that TikTok shop in the US did about $4 - $4.5B in gross sales and I have QVC in that same time doing maybe $25-30M which at the $30M end is about 0.75% of TikTok US sales at $4B mark. It would "seem" that there are a few that can do what QVC does." and "for Q4 I have QVC on TikTok around maybe $50-54M in gross revenue and meanwhile between Black Friday and Cyber Monday TikTok shop in the US did $500M. Again it would seem others can indeed do what QVC can do."

Business Insider reported "the app drove over $500 million in US sales during the four-day stretch between Black Friday and Cyber Monday.

Household-name brands like Disney, Samsung, and Ralph Lauren, once hesitant to sell in an unproven marketplace, all signed up for TikTok Shop in the US in recent months. Razor brand Harry's is paying as much as $150,000 a year to hire an in-house "TikTok Shop manager" who will monitor the app full-time". This is a clear indicator that others are indeed capable of playing this game. If a small company like Harry's Razor is investing $150,000.00 a year into an FTE to do nothing but TikTok shop then this tells me the MOAT on TikTok is just not there - anyone can pay-to-play. The danger too is more players increase the spend on the platform to get views which further erodes EBITDA margin."

If being a top ten seller mattered as much as you say then why are they not getting more market share on the platform? If TikTok did $500M between Black Friday and Cyber Monday and QVC did $50-54M in entire Q4 it would seem from this data that their share is very small.

I think the fact you have other players like Harry's Razor that are investing $150,000.00 into hiring an employee to do nothing but manage TikTok is a concern for dilution on TikTok. Each store that spends increases the fish in the tank and requires more spend to reach the same customers as before. If a company like Whatnot can come in and scale as fast as they have does that not also indicate whatever MOAT QVC had is much weaker than originally thought? Even if Whatnot is not at QVC's scale today the fact it's here should be a red flag to investors."

<< One last thing: I believe recent avg sale price is approaching $60.>>

Ave. sale price is not average transaction. Different measurements.

None of this changes the Q1 2026 math I just gave you either. I am not seeing $3,000M growth path here today.

Sean

[hunterdelarm] One last thing: I believe recent avg sale price is approaching $60 not $45 QVC,...

hunterdelarm — 4/2/2026 5:48:48 PM

One last thing: I believe recent avg sale price is approaching $60 not $45

QVC, Inc TikTok Shop Data - GMV, Best-Selling Products & Creator Partnerships | FastMoss

[hunterdelarm] Here is a good one from Reddit: One of my candle videos hit 400k views and ...

hunterdelarm — 4/2/2026 5:44:34 PM

Here is a good one from Reddit: One of my candle videos hit 400k views and I physically could not keep up with ecommerce fulfillment for three days straight : r/TikTokshop

QVC can help these folks... QVC (for a % of sales) makes all these issues go away. Yes there's competition on TT shop but how many of these folks want to deal with the operations? They can use QVC as a platform and it is a win win.

[hunterdelarm] "Most of you are well outside of your experience here and are making TERRIBLE fi...

hunterdelarm — 4/2/2026 5:31:45 PM

"Most of you are well outside of your experience here and are making TERRIBLE financial decisions because of it"

I completely agree with you. You are vastly more experienced and likely more collected than me. I do things different than you. I do not have vast knowledge on each financial entry/detail like you. I prefer to stick to methods that work for me. Let me give you an example:

Last weekend I went into a HomeGoods store and wow what a nice experience that was. Customers were coming in like a flood. Unique items, great prices and basically a better experience than Target and that is at a quarter of the floor space. Now I know I know.... anecdotal but this plants a seed. I start looking up homegoods and see sales have been doing well. Obviously, I cannot invest direct into homegoods but this is how it starts with me. I focus on the products/services and then go digging for financial stuff but only broad strokes.... If I get too deep into the financial stuff, I will probably find stuff that looks attractive but is not backed by good products/services. I will probably start becoming someone I am not and that is never a winning move.

QVC offers a unique shopping experience. The TT shop method is becoming more and more seamless/better. I see the value in this. It feels a bit cozy like homegoods. I then look at the financials... now this is a monster, and you know far more than me on this, but I do know that there are options.... management are seasoned veterans at this, and I trust they will find a way. I do not need to know every last detail... just enough and I feel I have enough info to continue my investment (I mean what more do I have to lose... I already am down some 60-70k+/90%+)

Are you likely to make more money than me in your investment life? Oh yeah/no doubt
Are you likely to make less mistakes than me? Yes/no doubt
Do you have all info/will you be right here? Maybe... maybe not