|From: Eric||6/18/2019 11:57:54 AM|
| Boeing & Aerospace Business |
British Airways parent company delivers a massive vote of confidence in the Boeing 737 MAX
June 18, 2019 at 8:05 am Updated June 18, 2019 at 8:47 am
Visitors walk on the tarmac at Paris Air Show, in Le Bourget, east of Paris, France, Tuesday, June 18, 2019. The world’s aviation elite are gathering at the Paris Air Show with safety concerns on many minds after two crashes of the popular Boeing 737 MAX. (AP Photo/Michel Euler) MEU101 MEU101 (Michel Euler / The Associated Press)
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
PARIS, France – International Airlines Group (IAG), the parent company of British Airways and a group of smaller European airlines, gave Boeing a tremendous boost at the Paris Air Show Tuesday, announcing plans to buy 200 Boeing 737 MAX planes and build its future single-aisle fleet with the currently grounded jet.
“We have every confidence in Boeing and expect that the aircraft will make a successful return to service in the coming months having received approval from the regulators,” said Willie Walsh, IAG chief executive.
The order is stunning in its impact. Walsh has opted to give the aircraft a vote of confidence at a moment following two deadly crashes when it not only cannot fly, but is still subject to safety investigations and reviews that have shaken public confidence in Boeing.
In addition, the MAX order marks an IAG defection from Airbus.
IAG has been a longtime operator of the bigger Boeing twin-aisle airplanes such as the 747 and 777. But its current single-aisle jet fleet — flying for British Airways, Aer Lingus of Ireland; Iberia and Vueling of Spain, and low-cost transatlantic startup LEVEL — is almost exclusively Airbus A320 family aircraft.
IAG said it it anticipates deploying the aircraft at a number of the group’s airlines including Vueling and LEVEL.
To spur competitive pricing, Walsh wants to diversify his future fleet which will now include both the 737 MAX and the A320neo.
The deal is not a finalized order but a letter of intent to buy a mix of 737 MAX 8s and MAX 10s, the biggest variant, the first of which still hasn’t flown.
Boeing said the deal is worth just over $24 billion at list prices. The real value of the planes after standard discounts in the industry, according to data from aircraft valuation firm Avitas, is about $11 billion.
However, such a large order agreed when the MAX badly needs support must have earned Walsh a discount much larger than standard.
Boeing Commercial Airplanes chief Kevin McAllister said his team is “truly honored and humbled by the leadership at International Airlines Group for placing their trust and confidence in the 737 MAX and, ultimately, in the people of Boeing and our deep commitment to quality and safety above all else.”
It’s difficult to imagine any better news for Boeing coming out of this year’s Paris Air Show at this pivotal point when the strain of the MAX crashes weighs so heavily on the company.
Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or firstname.lastname@example.org; on Twitter: @dominicgates.
|RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last Read|
|From: Eric||6/18/2019 12:12:04 PM|
| Boeing & Aerospace Business World |
Boeing ends Paris Air Show drought with 787 order
June 17, 2019 at 11:20 pm Updated June 18, 2019 at 6:45 am
Akbar Al Baker boards an Airbus A350-1000 passenger aircraft at the Paris Air Show at on June 17. Photographer: Jason Alden/Bloomberg (Bloomberg)
PARIS, France — Airbus was working to pad its lead Tuesday after a resounding first day of the Paris Air Show, when it shut out Boeing in aircraft orders by a score of $13 billion to nothing.
Boeing got in on the action with an order for 20 787s from Korean Air Lines, and Airbus promptly fired back with a deal from Saudi Arabia.
Here are the latest developments:
Boeing breaks drought
Boeing won a 30-plane 787 order from Korean Air Lines. The carrier agreed to buy 10 new 787-10s and 10 additional 787-9s valued at $6.3 billion at current list prices. Korean Air will also lease 10 787-10s from Air Lease Corp. The talks were earlier reported by Bloomberg.
Saudi boosts order
Saudi Arabian Airlines increased its commitment for A320neo jets from Airbus to as many as 100 aircraft, from up to 35 previously. The deal, including 15 of the newly launched long-distance A321XLR, would total about $7.5 billion at list prices.
Next up will be a decision over larger planes: “In addition to the narrow-body order, evaluations are currently under way for wide-body requirements, expected to be concluded within the next few months,” said Saleh Al-Jasser, the airline’s director general, in a statement.
Boeing, Air Lease strike deal
Air Lease Corp. reached a deal with Boeing to purchase five 787-9 Dreamliners, valued at $1.5 billion at list prices.
Israel’s Eviation Aircraft made a splash at the show with the unveiling of the all-electric Alice — billed as the world’s first full-sized zero-emission aircraft. The Alice will have its first flight later this year, followed by manufacturing in the U.S. and service entry in 2022. The nine-seat commuter plane has a range of 650 nautical miles and is designed for routes such as Paris to Toulouse and San Jose to San Diego, aiming to reduce costs by as much as 70%. U.S. carrier Cape Air was revealed as the first customer, with a planned fleet of 92 planes.
Norwegian Air Shuttle is in talks with Airbus to buy the latest A321XLR jetliner as it seeks the extra range to serve smaller cities in the U.S. Midwest. The new narrow-body was formally launched at the start of this week’s Paris Air Show.
The discount carrier originally ordered 30 A321LRs, and the total may be reduced with the switch, Bjorn Kjos, its chief executive officer, told Bloomberg Television at the expo.
The country’s largest carrier, Cebu Air, confirmed it has ordered 31 aircraft from Airbus including 10 long-range jets. The deal for 16 A330neo wide-bodies — beating out Boeing — and 15 A320neo-family aircraft includes 10 of the European planemaker’s new A321XLR model. The jets, scheduled for delivery from 2021 to 2026, would be worth $6.8 billion based on the list price.
Prospects for MAX takeoff
France’s Safran, which supplies engines for the Boeing 737 Max through its CFM International venture with General Electric, said it expects to see the grounded jet flying again this summer. But CEO Philippe Petitcolin warned that a delay beyond August would force a further slowdown in production beyond the cut of 10 planes a month — to 42 — that’s already been forced on the company.
“There’d be another reduction, I don’t think we’d have any other choice,” he said.
American Air Mulls Up to 50 XLR Jets
American Airlines Group is considering an order for as many as 50 of Airbus SE’s new long-range A321XLR jets, a person familiar with the discussions said.
The world’s largest carrier sees the plane, which would have the longest range of Airbus’s single-aisle offerings, as a potential replacement for its aging fleet of 34 Boeing Co. 757-200 jets, Bloomberg reported earlier this month. There’s no guarantee a deal will be reached.
Mitsubishi edges toward Bombardier
A takeover by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. of Bombardier’s CRJ regional jet program has merit, according to an executive at the Japanese company’s aviation unit.
“It would make a lot of sense in the context of developing and delivering global aircraft,” Steve Haro, a vice president at Mitsubishi Aircraft Corp. The comment raised the possibility that a deal could be reached soon.
Qatar Air nears new investment
Qatar Airways will announce a stake in a sixth overseas carrier in the coming months, Chief Executive Officer Akbar Al Baker said, as the Persian Gulf operator turns to outside investments to boost revenue and cash amid a Saudi-led embargo restricting its flights.
“We are buying stakes in successful airlines and we will continue to do so,” he said, without naming a target company. “Soon you will hear about another investment.”
–With assistance from Guy Johnson, Christopher Jasper, Cecilia Yap, Kyunghee Park, Layan Odeh and Sohee Kim.
|RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last Read|
|From: Eric||6/26/2019 12:25:02 PM|
| Boeing & Aerospace Business Times Watchdog |
The inside story of MCAS: How Boeing’s 737 MAX system gained power and lost safeguards
June 22, 2019 at 2:00 pm Updated June 24, 2019 at 5:25 pm
An angle-of-attack sensor can be seen at far right, near the nose of a 737 MAX at Boeing Field in Seattle. (Mike Siegel / The Seattle Times)
Seattle Times staff reporters
Early in the development of the 737 MAX, engineers gathered at Boeing’s transonic wind tunnel in Seattle to test the jet’s aerodynamics using a scale model with a wingspan comparable to that of an eagle.
The testing in 2012, with air flow approaching the speed of sound, allowed engineers to analyze how the airplane’s aerodynamics would handle a range of extreme maneuvers. When the data came back, according to an engineer involved in the testing, it was clear there was an issue to address.
Engineers observed a tendency for the plane’s nose to pitch upward during a specific extreme maneuver. After other efforts to fix the problem failed, the solution they arrived at was a piece of software — the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) — that would move a powerful control surface at the tail to push the airplane’s nose down.
This is the story, including previously unreported details, of how Boeing developed MCAS, which played a critical role in two airliners nose-diving out of the sky, killing 346 people in Ethiopia and off the coast of Indonesia.
Extensive interviews with people involved with the program, and a review of proprietary documents, show how Boeing originally designed MCAS as a simple solution with a narrow scope, then altered it late in the plane’s development to expand its power and purpose. Still, a safety-analysis led by Boeing concluded there would be little risk in the event of an MCAS failure — in part because of an FAA-approved assumption that pilots would respond to an unexpected activation in a mere three seconds.
The revised design allowed MCAS to trigger on the inputs of a single sensor, instead of two factors considered in the original plan. Boeing engineers considered that lack of redundancy acceptable, according to proprietary information reviewed by The Seattle Times, because they calculated the probability of a “hazardous” MCAS malfunction to be virtually inconceivable.
As Boeing and the FAA advanced the 737 MAX toward production, they limited the scrutiny and testing of the MCAS design. Then they agreed not to inform pilots about MCAS in manuals, even though Boeing’s safety analysis expected pilots to be the primary backstop in the event the system went haywire.
In the wake of the two crashes, despite an outcry from the public and from some pilot and airline industry officials, Boeing has defended the processes behind its MCAS design decisions and refused to accept blame.
The grounding of the MAX has entered its 15th week. Safety officials around the world are scrutinizing the changes to MCAS that Boeing has proposed to ensure such accidents won’t happen again. And they are assessing what training pilots may need on the new system.
“Safety is our top priority,” Boeing said in a statement. “Through the work we are doing now in partnership with our customers and regulators to certify and implement the software update, the 737 MAX will be one of the safest airplanes ever to fly.”
This investigation examines what’s known about the origins and operation of MCAS ahead of the final official accident-investigation reports, expected late this year for Lion Air Flight 610 and next year for Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.
Wind-tunnel and simulator tests
Though Boeing was locked into a plan to revamp its popular 737 model, the Seattle wind-tunnel tests in 2012 revealed a problem.
During flight tests to certify an airplane, pilots must safely fly an extreme maneuver, a banked spiral called a wind-up turn that brings the plane through a stall. While passengers would likely never experience the maneuver on a normal commercial flight, it could occur if pilots for some reason needed to execute a steep banking turn.
Engineers determined that on the MAX, the force the pilots feel in the control column as they execute this maneuver would not smoothly and continuously increase. Pilots who pull back forcefully on the column — sometimes called the stick — might suddenly feel a slackening of resistance. An FAA rule requires that the plane handle with smoothly changing stick forces.
The lack of smooth feel was caused by the jet’s tendency to pitch up, influenced by shock waves that form over the wing at high speeds and the extra lift surface provided by the pods around the MAX’s engines, which are bigger and farther forward on the wing than on previous 737s.
This was verified in early simulator modeling, with planes tested in scenarios at about 20,000 feet of altitude, according to one of the workers involved.
While the problem was narrow in scope, it proved difficult to cope with. The engineers first tried tweaking the plane’s aerodynamic shape, according to two workers familiar with the testing. They placed vortex generators — small metal vanes on the wings — to help modify the flow of air, trying them in different locations, in different quantities and at different angles. They also explored altering the shape of the wing.
737 MAX crisis | Complete coverage »
Is an iPad enough to train Boeing 737 MAX pilots? Famed pilot Sullenberger says he has a better idea
Boeing didn’t plan to fix 737 MAX warning light until 2020; it may have had a role in two deadly crashes
Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing and FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
Two people familiar with the discussions said 737 MAX chief test pilot Ray Craig preferred such a physical solution to solve the plane’s aerodynamics. Philosophically, Boeing had long opposed efforts to create automated actions such as a stick-pusher — a device used on some aircraft that without pilot action pushes the control column forward to lower the jet’s nose — that would seize control of a situation from the pilot, according to one of the people.
But the aerodynamic solutions didn’t produce enough effect, the two people said, and so the engineers turned to MCAS.
It was simple in concept but powerful in effect, quickly solving the issue.
In the midst of a wind-up turn, the software would automatically swivel up the leading edge of the plane’s entire horizontal tail, known as the horizontal stabilizer, so that the air flow would push the tail up and correspondingly push the nose down.
As the pilot pulled on the control column, this uncommanded movement in the background would counter the jet’s tendency to pitch up and smooth out the feel of the column throughout the maneuver.
An engineer recalled Craig testing MCAS for the first time in the simulator.
“Yeah! This is great,” Craig gushed after seeing how MCAS responded, according to the engineer. (Craig left Boeing before the operation of MCAS was revised.)
This original version of MCAS, according to two people familiar with the details, was activated only if two distinct sensors indicated such an extreme maneuver: a high angle of attack and a high G-force.
Angle of attack is the angle between the wing and the oncoming air flow. G-force is the plane’s acceleration in the vertical direction.
How much MCAS moved the tail when activated was a function of the angle of attack and the jet’s speed, said one of the people familiar with the MCAS design who, like many of the sources in this story, asked for anonymity because of the sensitivity of ongoing investigations.
The fix didn’t stir much controversy.
Another Boeing plane, the KC-46 Air Force tanker, has a software-driven system that similarly moves the stabilizer in a wind-up turn and even has the same MCAS name, though the design is very different.
Boeing’s failure analysis
When Boeing was ready to certify the 737 MAX, it laid out its plan for MCAS in documents for the FAA.
Under the proposal, MCAS would trigger in narrow circumstances. It was designed “to address potentially unacceptable nose-up pitching moment at high angles of attack at high airspeeds,” Boeing told the FAA in a proprietary System Safety Assessment reviewed by The Times.
In a separate presentation made for foreign safety regulators that was reviewed by The Times, Boeing described MCAS as providing “a nose down command to oppose the pitch up. Command is limited to 0.6 degrees from trimmed position.”
Two people involved in the initial design plans for MCAS said the goal was to limit the system’s effect, giving it as little authority as possible. That 0.6-degree limit was embedded in the company’s system safety review for the FAA.
The Boeing submission also included an analysis that calculated the effect of possible MCAS failures, with each scenario characterized as either a minor, a major or a hazardous failure — increasingly severe categories that determine how much redundancy must be built in to prevent the event.
Virtually all equipment on any commercial airplane, including the various sensors, is reliable enough to meet the “major failure” requirement, which is that the probability of a failure must be less than 1 in 100,000.
A “major failure” is not expected to produce any serious injuries and is defined more as something that would increase the cockpit crew’s workload. Such systems are therefore typically allowed to rely on a single input sensor.
Boeing analyzed what would happen if, in normal flight mode, MCAS triggered inadvertently up to its maximum authority and moved the horizontal stabilizer the maximum 0.6 degrees.
It also calculated what would happen on a normal flight if somehow the system kept running for three seconds at its standard rate of 0.27 degrees per second, producing 0.81 degrees of movement, thus exceeding the supposed maximum authority.
Why three seconds? That’s the period of time that FAA guidance says it should take a pilot to recognize what’s happening and begin to counter it.
Boeing assessed both of these failure modes as “major.” Finally, the analysis looked at the inadvertent operation of MCAS during a wind-up turn, which was assessed as “hazardous,” defined in a cold actuarial analysis as an event causing serious or fatal injuries to a small number of people, but short of losing the plane (that’s called “catastrophic”).
Hazardous events typically demand more than one sensor — except when they are outside normal flight conditions and unlikely to be encountered, such as a wind-up turn.
According to a document reviewed by The Seattle Times, Boeing’s safety analysis calculated this hazardous MCAS failure to be almost inconceivable: Given the improbability of an airliner experiencing a wind-up turn, compounded by the unlikelihood of MCAS failing while it happened, Boeing came up with a probability for this failure of about once every 223 trillion hours of flight. In its first year in service, the MAX fleet logged 118,000 flight hours.
So even though this original version of MCAS required two factors — angle of attack and G-force — to activate, Boeing’s analysis indicated that just one sensor would be acceptable in all circumstances.
In flight test, MCAS changes
About a third of the way through flight testing in 2016, as first reported by The Seattle Times in March, Boeing made substantial changes to MCAS.
The flight-test pilots had found another problem: The same lack of smooth stick forces was also occurring in certain low-speed flight conditions. To cover that issue too, engineers decided to expand the scope and power of MCAS.
Because at low speed a control surface must be deflected more to have the same effect, engineers increased the power of the system at low speed from 0.6 degrees of stabilizer nose-down deflection to 2.5 degrees each time it was activated.
On the stabilizer, maximum nose down is about 4.7 degrees away from level flight. So with the new increased authority to move the stabilizer, just a couple of iterations of the system could push it to that maximum.
Because there are no excessive G-forces at low speed, the engineers removed the G-force factor as a trigger. But that meant MCAS was now activated by a single angle-of-attack sensor.
One of the people familiar with MCAS’s evolution said the system designers didn’t see any need to add an additional sensor or redundancy because the hazard assessment had determined that an MCAS failure in normal flight would only qualify in the “major” category for which the single sensor is the norm.
“It wasn’t like it was there to cover some safety or certification requirement,” the person said. “The trigger isn’t a safeguard. It tells (the system) when to operate.”
While the changes were dramatic, Boeing did not submit documentation of the revised system safety assessment to the FAA.
An FAA spokesman said the safety agency did not require a new system safety analysis because it wasn’t deemed to be critical.
“The change to MCAS didn’t trigger an additional safety assessment because it did not affect the most critical phase of flight, considered to be higher cruise speeds,” he said.
The person familiar with the details of MCAS’ evolution said Boeing did the extra analysis of the new low-speed, higher-authority changes. He said the effect of the potential failures at low speed was less, and so didn’t add any risk to the prior analysis. So the documents sent to the FAA with the failure analysis were not revised.
“You turn in the answer,” he said. “You don’t have to document all your work.”
MCAS as it was actually implemented differed in another way from what was described in the safety analysis turned in to the FAA.
The failure analysis didn’t appear to consider the possibility that MCAS could trigger repeatedly, as it did on both accident flights. Moving multiple times in 0.6 or 2.5 increments depending on the speed, it effectively had unlimited authority if pilots did not intervene.
Discussions around this new MCAS design appear to have been limited during flight testing.
Two former Boeing test pilots described a culture of pressure inside the company to limit flight testing, which can delay projects at a time when orders are stacking up, costing the company money.
Matt Menza, a different pilot who did test flights on the MAX, recalled times when test pilots at Boeing would have the chance to thoroughly examine systems in what he called a “system-safety murder board” to explore all the potential failures. But he reported that the general corps of test pilots didn’t have a lot of technical details about the MCAS design, such as the single-sensor input.
Boeing never flight-tested a scenario in which a broken angle-of-attack sensor triggered MCAS on its own, instead relying on simulator analysis, according to a person familiar with the process. One of the former test pilots expressed bewilderment that the angle-of-attack failure was never explored in the air.
A variety of employees have described internal pressures to advance the MAX to completion, as Boeing hurried to catch up with the hot-selling A320 from rival Airbus.
Mark Rabin, an engineer who did flight-testing work unrelated to the flight controls, said there was always talk about how delays of even one day can cost substantial amounts. Meanwhile, staff were expected to stay in line, Rabin said.
“It was all about loyalty,” Rabin said. “I had a manager tell me, ‘Don’t rock the boat. You don’t want to be upsetting executives.’”
The interior of a Lion Air 737 MAX cockpit. (Dimas Ardian / Bloomberg)
Do pilots need more training? Boeing’s system safety analysis of MCAS, in working out the failure probabilities, assumes that the pilots will take steps in response to anything that arises, and will do so quickly.
The pilots’ struggles to control their planes before both MAX crashes suggest that the FAA’s three-second guidance for expected pilot response time, upon which part of Boeing’s system safety analysis was based, needs to be carefully reassessed.
“If the three seconds is not an appropriate amount of time to be able to catch a runaway stabilizer, and it actually takes seven seconds, then … we need to understand that,” said the person familiar with the details of MCAS.
When MCAS is activated in the cockpit and moves the horizontal stabilizer, a large wheel beside each pilot that’s mechanically connected to the stabilizer begins to spin. This is the manual trim wheel. As a last resort to stop a stabilizer moving uncommanded, a pilot can grab and hold the wheel.
In a 737 MAX cockpit console, the black wheels on each side are connected to the horizontal tail and will spin if the stabilizer swivels. The instruments... (Dimas Ardian / Bloomberg)
The person familiar with MCAS said the wheel will spin noisily and fast, 30 or 40 times, for each activation. Meanwhile the stabilizer movement will increase the force needed to hold the control column, by about 40 to 50 pounds for a 2.5 degree movement. Such uncommanded movement that won’t stop is referred to as a “runaway stabilizer.”
Boeing has said that to deal with this, pilots need first to have basic hand-flying skills — pull the nose up to where you want it, then use the thumb switches on the yoke that connect electrically to the stabilizer to neutralize the forces — and then shut off MCAS with a pilot checklist procedure on how to handle a “runaway stabilizer.”
However on both accident flights, the angle-of-attack sensor failure set off multiple alerts causing distraction and confusion from the moment of takeoff, even before MCAS kicked in.
On the Ethiopian Airlines flight, for example, a “stick shaker” noisily vibrated the pilot’s control column throughout the flight, warning the plane was in danger of a stall, which it wasn’t; a computerized voice repeating a loud “Don’t sink!” warned that the jet was too close to the ground; a “clacker” making a very loud clicking sound signaled the jet was going too fast; and multiple warning lights told the crew that the speed, altitude and other readings on their instruments were unreliable.
Exactly what pilot training for MCAS is appropriate has become a big issue that threatens to prolong the grounding of the MAX.
While the FAA and U.S. airlines seem ready to clear the plane to fly with just iPad training for American pilots on the MCAS fixes, some foreign regulators want more intensive simulator training for all pilots on how to handle a runaway stabilizer.
Talk to us
We continue to seek information on the design, training and certification of the Boeing 737 MAX. If you have insights, please get in touch with aerospace reporter Dominic Gates at 206-464-2963 or email@example.com.
To communicate on a confidential and encrypted channel, follow the options available at st.news.
Early in the process of selling the MAX, according to two people familiar with the discussions, Boeing promised to give Southwest Airlines a substantial rebate for every plane if the MAX required simulator training.
One former MAX worker, Rick Ludtke, said the rebate reported to him by managers was $1 million per plane, a figure another Boeing employee indicated is roughly accurate.
A Southwest spokesperson said, “We do not discuss publicly the specific details of our contractual agreements,” but added that “the purchase of an aircraft is a significant investment, and guarantees for various items … are incorporated into every 737 contract.”
Ludtke and two other former workers described internal pressures during the MAX certification to avoid any changes to the design of the plane that might cause the FAA to lean toward a simulator mandate.
It became a significant point of attention for Michael Teal, the 737 MAX program manager, and Keith Leverkuhn, vice president and general manager of the 737 MAX program, according to a person involved in the discussions. They felt confident based on past experience that the MAX would be approved without simulator training, but they were wary, according to the worker.
Meanwhile, Boeing’s chief technical pilot on the MAX, Mark Forkner, was also facing pressure, according to another person involved in the project. The person recalled Forkner as frequently anxious about the deadlines and pressures faced in the program, going to some of his peers in the piloting world for help.
As first reported by The New York Times, Forkner suggested to the FAA that MCAS not be included in the pilot manual, according to a person familiar with the discussions.
“Mark never dreamed anything like this could happen,” said Forkner’s attorney, David Gerger. “He put safety first – at this job and in the Air Force.”
U.S. pilot unions have expressed concern at the omission of MCAS from the manual. One reason is that when MCAS activates, it changes somewhat the response of the airplane.
For example, there is a cutout switch in the control column so that when a pilot pulls or pushes in the opposite direction to a runaway stabilizer, it cuts electric power to the stabilizer. When MCAS is active, this cutout switch doesn’t work, which could surprise a pilot who didn’t know about the system.
Boeing ultimately won the FAA’s approval to give pilots just an hour of training through an iPad about the differences between the MAX and the previous 737 generation. MCAS was not mentioned.
The FAA, after internal deliberations, also agreed to keep MCAS out of the manual, reasoning that MCAS was a software code that operates in the background as part of the flight-control system, according to an official familiar with the discussions.
Two angle-of-attack sensors that influence the MCAS system are located on each side and below other instruments on the 737 MAX. Boeing chose to use only... (Mike Siegel / The Seattle Times)
A single sensor
Boeing has avoided accepting direct blame in public, saying MCAS was only one link in a chain of events. Its leaders have also said MCAS was designed according to the standard procedures it has used for years.
“The 737 MAX was certified in accordance with the identical FAA requirements and processes that have governed certification of previous new airplanes and derivatives. The FAA considered the final configuration and operating parameters of MCAS during MAX certification, and concluded that it met all certification and regulatory requirements,” Boeing said in a statement.
The most controversial detail of the MCAS design has been the reliance on a single angle-of-attack sensor. On both of the deadly flights, everything started with a faulty sensor. In the second crash in Ethiopia, the data trace strongly suggests that the sensor was destroyed in an instant, likely by a bird strike.
There are two such sensors, one on either side of the fuselage. Why didn’t Boeing, especially after discarding the G-force as a trigger, use both angle-of-attack sensors?
The thinking was that requiring input from two angle-of-attack sensors would mean that if either one failed the system would not function.
That has implications not only for safety but for airline costs. If the system is down, a pilot might fly into a situation where it’s needed and find it unavailable. Or the airline might have to take the plane out of service and lose money.
Both factors point toward a principle of not adding complexity: Keep a system as simple as possible.
“You don’t want to disrupt your customer’s operations,” said the person familiar with the MCAS details. And you don’t want to “increase the risk that the system fails when you need it.”
In this case, as simple as possible meant as minimal as the safety regulations allow. Since Boeing’s system safety analysis concluded that one sensor was acceptable, that’s what it went with.
But that’s not the logic followed for a system on the KC-46 Air Force tanker, also called MCAS.
Boeing says the MCAS systems on the MAX and on the tanker share only a name and a similar function, and have completely different avionics.
But they both move the horizontal stabilizer to smooth the pilot stick forces in a wind-up turn. Their basic design architecture can be compared to some extent.
Air Force spokeswoman Ann Stefanek says “MCAS on the KC-46 has two sensors and the system compares the two readings.”
Boeing’s proposed update to MCAS for the MAX will have the same.
Last Sunday at the Paris Air Show, Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg reiterated the company’s position that while the original MCAS was properly designed, “we know we can improve it.”
The fixes include relying on two sensors rather than one, limiting MCAS to one rather than multiple activations, and revising the software.
“We are confident that they will result in a safe airplane, one of the safest airplanes ever to fly, and that MCAS will not contribute to a future accident,” he said.
Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or firstname.lastname@example.org; on Twitter: @dominicgates.
Mike Baker: 206-464-2729 or email@example.com; on Twitter: @ByMikeBaker.
|RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last Read|
|From: Eric||8/8/2019 6:35:55 AM|
| Boeing & Aerospace Business |
Boeing CEO: Lingering engine fix will push back first flight and delivery of 777X
Aug. 7, 2019 at 12:53 pm Updated Aug. 7, 2019 at 9:57 pm
Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg, pictured at company headquarters in January, told investors Wednesday the 777X jet’s GE engines would not be ready for first flight until early 2020. (Dean Rutz / Seattle Times)
Seattle Times staff reporter
A lingering engine fix on Boeing’s new widebody 777X jet will delay its first flight until early next year and will push back first delivery of the plane until the end of 2020, Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg told an investors’ conference in New York early Wednesday.
“We are addressing engine issues, and GE has had some challenges on the first engine that we discovered in some of the reliability testing,” Muilenburg said, discussing the company’s outlook at the Jefferies Global Industrials Conference in New York City.
“They’re making some component changes,” Mulenburg added. “We believe we have our arms around the change that’s required, but some additional testing has to be done yet, and as a result we don’t expect first flight to occur until early next year.”
The further delay of Boeing’s big new jet — already running months later than the company had initially anticipated — marks yet another setback for Boeing, as it grapples with the ongoing crisis of its grounded 737 MAX jet program. Delay of the 777X’s entry into service could hit both Boeing’s airline customers and its suppliers.
The Boeing 777X has the biggest jet engines ever made. A GE9X is seen here inside the Everett assembly plant. A problem with the engine will delay the first flight of the new plane. (Mike Siegel / The Seattle Times)
Wing mechanics work under the new 777X carbon-fiber wings, the largest wings on any Boeing jet. (Mike Siegel / The Seattle Times)
“We’re still driving towards first delivery by the end of 2020, but there is pressure on that schedule because of the delay in the engine and first flight,” Muilenburg said during the Jefferies conference, audio of which was webcast live.
More on Boeing and the 777X
Heads up for Boeing’s new 777X and 797 airplanes (February)
The big jet behind Everett’s big doors: Boeing readies first 777X to fly (2018)
GE Aviation executives previously revealed at the Paris Air Show in June that their engineers had come up with a fix for the problem with the new GE9X engine, but extensive testing required to certify the engine likely wouldn’t be completed until “later in the fall.” Boeing won’t fly the 777X, which initially had been planned to enter service by the middle of next year, until the engine is certified
Days before the revelation in Paris, an executive for Gulf carrier Emirates, the first customer of the 777X, had said delays in the jet program could squeeze the airline’s timeline, which then depended on taking delivery of the first jet next June.
That timeline won’t be met. According to Muilenburg’s statement Wednesday, the first delivery now won’t occur until at least the end of 2020.
It typically takes a year or more to go from first flight, through the certification of the airplane by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), to entry into service — assuming no unexpected hitches. On the 737 MAX program, for example, the plane entered commercial service 16 months after first flight.
Still, Muilenburg presented a rosy outlook to investors for the 777X program and Boeing in general.
“The airplane itself is looking really good in the factory and gauntlet testing,” he said. “We’ve got to work our way through the engine, get up first flight early next year, do the flight test program and then begin delivering airplanes. The backlog, the orders opportunity, the way it will fit with our airline fleet networks — it’s going to be a great airplane.”
As for its troubled 737 MAX program, Boeing still remains optimistic the jet will win regulatory approval to return to service “early in the fourth quarter,” Muilenburg said.
The MAX has been grounded since March, following the second of two crashes within five months that killed 346 people. A problem with an automated anti-stall flight control system, known as MCAS, has been implicated as a contributing factor in both crashes. Boeing is now working on a software overhaul for the flight control system.
“We still anticipate submitting that certification package to the FAA in the September time frame, so working towards a return to service for the MAX early in the fourth quarter,” Muilenburg said.
The chief executive added Boeing is now working “on training and education materials” and is “out doing simulation sessions” with airline customers around the world to ensure a quick return of MAX jets to fleet operations when regulatory approvals come.
The company also is now working with the more than 600 suppliers to the MAX chain to ensure “the production system’s health and stability,” he said.
Boeing announced in July it would take a $4.9 billion charge in the second quarter to compensate airline customers for delayed deliveries and disrupted schedules due to the MAX’s grounding — causing the biggest quarterly loss in company history. Still, Muilenburg painted an optimistic outlook for investors.
“The long-term prospects of our business remain very solid, and we still expect this to be a year-over-year cash growth business long-term,” he said.
During the jet’s grounding, Boeing has slowed production rate of the MAX from 52 airplanes per month to 42. The company hasn’t yet resorted to layoffs, nor has it lost any orders with “4,400 MAXs in backlog,” Muilenburg said. Once the return-to-service approvals come, the company plans to ramp up production of the MAX to 57 planes per month, he said.
Meantime, the FAA’s certification program that in recent years has delegated much of its oversight of new Boeing aircraft safety to Boeing itself has come under intense scrutiny.
When asked about the company’s contingency plans should the regulatory approvals for returning the MAX to flight prove longer than expected, Muilenburg reiterated that “lower production rates or a temporary shutdown to the production line” in Renton remain an option.
Most Read Business Stories
Boeing CEO: Lingering engine fix will push back first flight and delivery of 777X
FedEx to end ground delivery business with Amazon
Newly stringent FAA tests spur a fundamental software redesign of Boeing’s 737 MAX flight controls
“Those are not decisions that we would make lightly,” he added. “If you think about our production line — again, 600 some suppliers — hundreds of thousands of jobs that would be impacted.”
Boeing remains optimistic about the future of the MAX, Muilenburg added.
“We know that it will take some time to rebuild public confidence, but we do believe with the software updates, the MAX will be one of the safest planes ever to fly,” he said. “We are very confident in that.”
Lewis Kamb: 206-464-2932 or firstname.lastname@example.org; on Twitter: @lewiskamb.
|RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last Read|
|From: John Koligman||10/2/2019 12:56:08 PM|
|Boeing Engineer Says 737 Max Safety System Was Vetoed Over Cost|
A Boeing 737 Max in Renton, Wash. The company’s best-selling model remains grounded after two fatal crashes.CreditCreditRuth Fremson/The New York Times
By Natalie Kitroeff, David Gelles and Jack Nicas
Oct. 2, 2019Updated 10:06 a.m. ET
A senior Boeing engineer filed an internal ethics complaint this year saying that during the development of the 737 Max jet the company had rejected a safety system to minimize costs, equipment that he felt could have reduced risks that contributed to two fatal crashes.
Boeing has provided the complaint, which was reviewed by The New York Times, to the Department of Justice as part of a criminal investigation into the design of the Max, according to a person with knowledge of the inquiry who requested anonymity given the ongoing legal matter. Federal investigators have questioned at least one former Boeing employee about the allegations, said another person with knowledge of the discussions who similarly requested anonymity.
It is unclear what, if any, assessment investigators have made of the complaint.
The complaint, filed after the two crashes, builds on concerns about Boeing’s corporate culture, as the company tries to repair its reputation and get the planes flying again.
Many current and former Boeing employees have privately discussed problems with the design and decision-making process on the 737 Max, outlining episodes when managers dismissed engineers’ recommendations or prioritized profits. The engineer who filed the ethics concerns this year, Curtis Ewbank, went a step further, lodging a formal complaint and calling out the chief executive for publicly misrepresenting the safety of the plane.
During the development of the 737 Max, Mr. Ewbank worked on the cockpit systems that pilots use to monitor and control the airplane. In his complaint to Boeing, he said that managers were urged to study a backup system for calculating the plane’s airspeed. The system, known as synthetic airspeed, draws on several data sources to measure how fast a plane is flying.
Such equipment, Mr. Ewbank said, could detect when the angle-of-attack sensors, which measure the plane’s position in the sky, were malfunctioning and prevent other systems from relying on that faulty information. A version of the system is used on Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner, a new model of plane.
Mr. Ewbank did not respond to requests for comment.
In both crashes of the Max, an angle-of-attack sensor is believed to have failed, sending bad data to automated software designed to help prevent stalls. That software, known as MCAS, then activated erroneously, sending the planes into irrecoverable nose dives.
Mr. Ewbank noted in the complaint, “It is not possible to say for certain that any actual implementation of synthetic airspeed on the 737 Max would have prevented the accidents” in Ethiopia and Indonesia. But he said that Boeing’s actions on the issue pointed to a culture that emphasized profit in some cases, at the expense of safety.
Throughout the development of the Max, Boeing tried to avoid adding components that could force airlines to train pilots in flight simulators, costing tens of millions of dollars over the life of an aircraft. Significant changes to the Max could also have required the more onerous approval for a new plane, rather than the streamlined certification process for a derivative model.
The Dangerous Flaws in Boeing’s Automated SystemHere’s why a system designed to stabilize the 737 Max may have caused two deadly crashes in five months.
According to Mr. Ewbank’s complaint, Ray Craig, a chief test pilot of the 737, and other engineers wanted to study the possibility of adding the synthetic airspeed system to the Max. But a Boeing executive decided not to look into the matter because of its potential cost and effect on training requirements for pilots.
“I was willing to stand up for safety and quality, but was unable to actually have an effect in those areas,” Mr. Ewbank said in the complaint, adding, “Boeing management was more concerned with cost and schedule than safety or quality.”
His account, and the description of the system’s benefits on the 787 Dreamliner, was backed up by a former senior Boeing employee involved in the discussions who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the continuing Justice Department investigation. The former Boeing employee, who worked on the Max, confirmed that executives had discussed the system. The employee said they had determined that trying to install such new technology onto the 737 Max, a plane based on a 1960s-era design, would be too complicated and risky for the project, which was on a tight development schedule.
But the former Boeing employee said that Mr. Ewbank’s complaint overstated the importance of such a system and understated the complexity of adding it to the 737 Max. This employee said that Boeing had only installed the system on the 787 Dreamliners, noting that it was unclear how or whether the Max could similarly calculate synthetic airspeed, because it has fewer sensors. The employee also did not recall Boeing executives citing the potential impact on pilot training when deciding not to study adding the system.
A Boeing spokesman, Gordon Johndroe, said in a statement, “Safety, quality and integrity are at the core of Boeing’s values.”
“Boeing offers its employees a number of channels for raising concerns and complaints and has rigorous processes in place, both to ensure that such complaints receive thorough consideration and to protect the confidentiality of employees who make them,” he added.
Shares of Boeing fell as much as 1.7% in early morning trading Wednesday.
Peter Carr, a spokesman for the Department of Justice, declined to comment on the complaint.
Mr. Ewbank worked as an engineer at Boeing from 2010 to 2015, and was generally well regarded by his colleagues, according to two people with knowledge of his work who requested anonymity to discuss a sensitive internal inquiry. In Mr. Ewbank’s complaint, he said he had left the company in part because he had become concerned that the company was not prioritizing safety. He returned to the company in 2018, where he is now working on the development of a new 777.
Mr. Ewbank said that he did not initially file a complaint during the development of the Max, in part because the “fear of retaliation is high.”
He stepped forward this year, he explained in the complaint, because of the “ethical imperative of an engineer — to protect the safety of the public.”
“Boeing is not in a business where safety can be treated as a secondary concern,” Mr. Ewbank wrote in the complaint. “But the current culture of expediency of design-to-market and cost cutting does not permit any other treatment by the work force tasked with making executive managements’ fever dreams a reality.”
|RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last Read|
|From: Eric||10/16/2019 2:58:57 PM|
| Boeing & Aerospace Business|
Questions raised about photos used as evidence of repairs in Lion Air, Boeing 737 MAX crash investigation
Oct. 15, 2019 at 6:36 pm Updated Oct. 15, 2019 at 7:16 pm
The cockpit of a grounded Lion Air 737 MAX 8 jet. The crash of an Ethiopian Airlines plane bore similarities to the Oct. 29 crash of a Lion Air plane, stoking concerns that a feature meant to make the upgraded MAX safer has actually made it harder to fly. (Dimas Ardian / Bloomberg)
Weeks after a Lion Air jet crashed in the Java Sea, killing all 189 aboard, an airline employee gave investigators photographs meant to show that a crucial repair had been properly performed the day before the disaster.
Yet the photos may not show what was claimed.
The time displayed in photos of a computer screen in the cockpit of the Boeing 737 MAX indicated they actually had been taken before the repair was performed, according to a draft of the final crash report being prepared by Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), portions of which were reviewed by Bloomberg News.
Investigators were similarly unable to confirm the authenticity of other photos in the packet, which were supposed to show how a piece of equipment near the jet’s nose had been calibrated, according to the report. There were indications that the pictures depicted a different plane, according to two people familiar with the investigation.
The draft report doesn’t say whether anyone falsified or misrepresented the photos — which would be considered a serious breach of protocol — but concludes that they may not be valid evidence.
The incident injected additional tension into the already fraught international investigation in which billions of dollars and the reputations of airlines, manufacturers and entire nations are on the line.
737 MAX CRISIS
Dennis Muilenburg out as Boeing chairman but keeps CEO position
Boeing rejected 737 MAX safety upgrades before fatal crashes, whistleblower says
Extra pilot saved doomed Lion Air jetliner on next-to-last fli
According to one person briefed on the matter, the Indonesia-based airline has told investigators that the allegations about the photos are unsubstantiated and shouldn’t be mentioned in the final report of the October 2018 crash. But to others involved in one of the most significant accident probes in decades, it could represent an attempt to mislead investigators about a critical aspect of the case and needs to be documented, said two other people who were briefed about the existence of the photos.
Lion Air spokesman Danang Prihantoro said that he could not comment on the investigation. Representatives of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) declined to comment on the existence of the photos.
Indonesia’s NTSC, which is overseeing the investigation, is finalizing the report and expects to release it by early November. Anggo Anurogo, a spokesman for the investigation agency, said it wouldn’t comment on the report before its release.
Portions of the draft reviewed by Bloomberg News say an engineer gave the photos to investigators to show that the replacement of a sensor on the plane on Oct. 28 had been done properly. The sensor, known as an “angle-of-attack” vane, was malfunctioning on the very next flight as well as the one the next day that crashed and is at the heart of the investigation, according to an NTSC preliminary report released last November.
Some of the images were taken of the inside of an equipment compartment where the faulty sensor was attached, according to the people familiar with the investigation. Part of the calibration process occurs in that location.
Visible in the background of these photos was other equipment with identification marks, the people said. Officials at Boeing were able to trace at least one of the devices to a different 737 MAX jet operated by Lion Air, they said.
Other photos were shot in a 737 MAX cockpit, where mechanics check to see that the sensor is providing accurate readings, the people said. Those photos showed the captain’s flight display, but the time shown on its digital clock was before the repair being performed, according to the draft report.
Lion Air, which already was pushing back on preliminary conclusions by investigators, has challenged assertions that the photos were falsified and asked the NTSC not to include the pictures and any reference to them in its final report, according to one person familiar with the airline’s view of the matter.
The airline further said the photos didn’t come from the carrier, the person said. The pictures were blurry, and the airline couldn’t understand how equipment markings could have been identified, the person said.
Investigative reports of crashes often contain hundreds of pages and document evidence collected and significant issues faced during the probe.
The repair depicted by the photos is central to the investigation. A malfunction of the angle-of-attack sensor is believed to have triggered an automated system on the plane to repeatedly force its nose down, eventually causing the pilots to lose control and crash at high speed into the ocean.
Documents reviewed by Bloomberg News show the repair station XTRA Aerospace in Miramar, Florida, had worked on the sensor. It was installed on the Lion Air plane on Oct. 28 in Denpasar, Indonesia, after pilots on earlier flights had reported problems with instruments displaying speed and altitude. XTRA has said it is cooperating with the investigation.
For months, examinations of the Lion Air crash and the second, similar accident March 10 of a 737 MAX operated by Ethiopian Airlines have focused on the angle-of-attack sensors and their role in the functioning of a feature built into the jet known as Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System.
MCAS, designed to keep the nose of the plane from drifting too far up in flight, was fed data from one of the plane’s two angle-of-attack sensors, devices that protrude from the jet’s nose and resemble a weather vane.
When it senses the nose has risen too far, it automatically pushes it back down, reducing the risk of an aerodynamic stall. Investigators believe a malfunction of the sensor on board the Lion Air flight mistakenly forced the nose of the plane down repeatedly until the pilots lost control.
The same failure occurred Oct. 28 immediately after the repair on the Lion Air jet, but pilots on that flight were able to recover and fly to their destination. Not so on the final flight of the jet, when the pilots began fighting for control shortly after takeoff.
The plane hit the water in a high-speed dive, shattering into pieces. While investigators haven’t said whether they’ve recovered the angle-of-attack sensor from the bottom of the sea, the plane’s black-box flight recorder was brought up and confirmed the sensor was malfunctioning.
The crash, and the Ethiopian Airlines disaster months later, prompted a worldwide grounding of Boeing’s best-selling jet, leading to billions of dollars in losses and international investigations into how the system was designed and approved.
The mechanic who worked on the Lion Air jet before the crash reported the new device was installed according to the maintenance procedure, the November 2018 preliminary report said.
“Installation test and heater system test result good,” said an entry in the plane’s maintenance log included in the report. The mechanic also told a pilot about to fly the plane that the sensor “had been tested accordingly,” the report said.
However, data in the report suggest the calibration wasn’t done properly or at all, said John Goglia, a former airline mechanic who used to serve on the NTSB.
Such processes are routine and relatively simple, Goglia said. The procedure is designed as a fail-safe to ensure that a mechanic can quickly determine whether a newly installed sensor isn’t working.
“They were given an unairworthy airplane because the maintenance was incomplete and didn’t correct the problem,” he said.
|RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last Read|
|From: Jamie153||10/18/2019 1:41:21 PM|
|Boeing shares slide after FAA discovered ‘concerning’ messages about 737 Max certification|
A Boeing test pilot complained in the 2016 message that the system, known as MCAS, was difficult to control, the New York Times reported. Pilots at airlines including American complained after the crashes that it did not know about the system, known as MCAS, until after the first crash.
|RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last ReadRead Replies (1)|